Cryptographically blinded games: leveraging players' limitations for equilibria and profit. Hubácek, P. & Park, S. In Babaioff, M., Conitzer, V., & Easley, D. A., editors, ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC '14, Stanford , CA, USA, June 8-12, 2014, pages 207–208, 2014. ACM.
Cryptographically blinded games: leveraging players' limitations for equilibria and profit [link]Paper  doi  bibtex   
@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/sigecom/HubacekP14,
  author    = {Pavel Hub{\'{a}}cek and
               Sunoo Park},
  editor    = {Moshe Babaioff and
               Vincent Conitzer and
               David A. Easley},
  title     = {Cryptographically blinded games: leveraging players' limitations for
               equilibria and profit},
  booktitle = {{ACM} Conference on Economics and Computation, {EC} '14, Stanford
               , CA, USA, June 8-12, 2014},
  pages     = {207--208},
  publisher = {{ACM}},
  year      = {2014},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602903},
  doi       = {10.1145/2600057.2602903},
  timestamp = {Tue, 15 Oct 2019 12:02:28 +0200},
  biburl    = {https://dblp.org/rec/conf/sigecom/HubacekP14.bib},
  bibsource = {dblp computer science bibliography, https://dblp.org}
}

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