@unpublished{JablonskiFraud,
  title={How Violence and Fraud Neutralize Information Effects on Turnout: A Field Experiment in Uganda},
  author={Jablonski, Ryan and Buntaine, Mark and Pickering, Paula and Nielson, Daniel},
year={2021},
abstract={Information about corruption should motivate voters to show up at the polls to “throw the bums out.” However, this effect presupposes that ballots remains secret and that voters face a low risk of violence at polling places. Yet in electoral autocracies the accountability relationship can break down, since showing up to vote in support of opposition candidates may place a voter at risk of government repercussions, especially if votes are not expected to be private. Where violence and privacy violations are anticipated, exposure to information about corruption may have little effect on turnout. We evaluate this theory using a large randomized­ controlled trial(n=16,083) conducted in Uganda for the 2016 district elections. We treated eligible voters with factual, non­partisan information about irregularities in the management of local government budgets using SMS messaging. We find that this information caused the expected turnout effects, but only in the absence of nearby electoral violence and for voters who had relatively high expectations that their votes would remain secret. These results imply that electoral violence and privacy violations are key impediments to voters’ seeking accountability from their elected officials at the polls and suggest that repressive tactics may be particularly useful for incumbents when corruption is rampant.},
url_Pre-Analysis_Plan={http://egap.org/registration/1615},
url_Paper={http://r.s.jablonski.s3.amazonaws.com/articles/BJNP%20Corruption%20and%20Turnout.pdf?wp}
}

{"_id":"FRLYbgJhFv2Wmzmsv","bibbaseid":"jablonski-buntaine-pickering-nielson-howviolenceandfraudneutralizeinformationeffectsonturnoutafieldexperimentinuganda-2021","author_short":["Jablonski, R.","Buntaine, M.","Pickering, P.","Nielson, D."],"bibdata":{"bibtype":"unpublished","type":"unpublished","title":"How Violence and Fraud Neutralize Information Effects on Turnout: A Field Experiment in Uganda","author":[{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Jablonski"],"firstnames":["Ryan"],"suffixes":[]},{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Buntaine"],"firstnames":["Mark"],"suffixes":[]},{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Pickering"],"firstnames":["Paula"],"suffixes":[]},{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Nielson"],"firstnames":["Daniel"],"suffixes":[]}],"year":"2021","abstract":"Information about corruption should motivate voters to show up at the polls to “throw the bums out.” However, this effect presupposes that ballots remains secret and that voters face a low risk of violence at polling places. Yet in electoral autocracies the accountability relationship can break down, since showing up to vote in support of opposition candidates may place a voter at risk of government repercussions, especially if votes are not expected to be private. Where violence and privacy violations are anticipated, exposure to information about corruption may have little effect on turnout. We evaluate this theory using a large randomized­ controlled trial(n=16,083) conducted in Uganda for the 2016 district elections. We treated eligible voters with factual, non­partisan information about irregularities in the management of local government budgets using SMS messaging. We find that this information caused the expected turnout effects, but only in the absence of nearby electoral violence and for voters who had relatively high expectations that their votes would remain secret. These results imply that electoral violence and privacy violations are key impediments to voters’ seeking accountability from their elected officials at the polls and suggest that repressive tactics may be particularly useful for incumbents when corruption is rampant.","url_pre-analysis_plan":"http://egap.org/registration/1615","url_paper":"http://r.s.jablonski.s3.amazonaws.com/articles/BJNP%20Corruption%20and%20Turnout.pdf?wp","bibtex":"@unpublished{JablonskiFraud,\r\n title={How Violence and Fraud Neutralize Information Effects on Turnout: A Field Experiment in Uganda},\r\n author={Jablonski, Ryan and Buntaine, Mark and Pickering, Paula and Nielson, Daniel},\r\nyear={2021},\r\nabstract={Information about corruption should motivate voters to show up at the polls to “throw the bums out.” However, this effect presupposes that ballots remains secret and that voters face a low risk of violence at polling places. Yet in electoral autocracies the accountability relationship can break down, since showing up to vote in support of opposition candidates may place a voter at risk of government repercussions, especially if votes are not expected to be private. Where violence and privacy violations are anticipated, exposure to information about corruption may have little effect on turnout. We evaluate this theory using a large randomized­ controlled trial(n=16,083) conducted in Uganda for the 2016 district elections. We treated eligible voters with factual, non­partisan information about irregularities in the management of local government budgets using SMS messaging. We find that this information caused the expected turnout effects, but only in the absence of nearby electoral violence and for voters who had relatively high expectations that their votes would remain secret. These results imply that electoral violence and privacy violations are key impediments to voters’ seeking accountability from their elected officials at the polls and suggest that repressive tactics may be particularly useful for incumbents when corruption is rampant.},\r\nurl_Pre-Analysis_Plan={http://egap.org/registration/1615},\r\nurl_Paper={http://r.s.jablonski.s3.amazonaws.com/articles/BJNP%20Corruption%20and%20Turnout.pdf?wp}\r\n}\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n","author_short":["Jablonski, R.","Buntaine, M.","Pickering, P.","Nielson, D."],"key":"JablonskiFraud","id":"JablonskiFraud","bibbaseid":"jablonski-buntaine-pickering-nielson-howviolenceandfraudneutralizeinformationeffectsonturnoutafieldexperimentinuganda-2021","role":"author","urls":{" pre-analysis plan":"http://egap.org/registration/1615"," paper":"http://r.s.jablonski.s3.amazonaws.com/articles/BJNP%20Corruption%20and%20Turnout.pdf?wp"},"metadata":{"authorlinks":{}},"downloads":10},"bibtype":"unpublished","biburl":"www.ryanjablonski.com/wp.bib","dataSources":["NSDZnFfvnQYbzJwEu"],"keywords":[],"search_terms":["violence","fraud","neutralize","information","effects","turnout","field","experiment","uganda","jablonski","buntaine","pickering","nielson"],"title":"How Violence and Fraud Neutralize Information Effects on Turnout: A Field Experiment in Uganda","year":2021,"downloads":11}