How you know you are not a brain in a vat. Jackson, A. Philosophical Studies, 172(10):2799–2822, 2015. ![How you know you are not a brain in a vat [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex A sensible epistemologist may not see how she could know that she is not a brain in a vat (BIV); but she doesn't panic. She sticks with her empirical beliefs, and as that requires, believes that she is not a BIV. (She does not infer entially base her belief that she is not a BIV on her empirical knowledge—she rejects that 'Moorean' response to skepticism.) Drawing on the psychological lit erature on metacognition, I describe a mechanism that's plausibly responsible for a sensible epistemologist coming to believe she is not a BIV. I propose she thereby knows that she is not a BIV. The particular belief-forming mechanism employed explains why she overlooks this account of how she knows she is not a BIV, making it seem that there is no way for her to know it. I argue this proposal satisfactorily resolves the skeptical puzzle.
@article{Jackson2015,
abstract = {A sensible epistemologist may not see how she could know that she is not a brain in a vat (BIV); but she doesn't panic. She sticks with her empirical beliefs, and as that requires, believes that she is not a BIV. (She does not infer entially base her belief that she is not a BIV on her empirical knowledge—she rejects that 'Moorean' response to skepticism.) Drawing on the psychological lit erature on metacognition, I describe a mechanism that's plausibly responsible for a sensible epistemologist coming to believe she is not a BIV. I propose she thereby knows that she is not a BIV. The particular belief-forming mechanism employed explains why she overlooks this account of how she knows she is not a BIV, making it seem that there is no way for her to know it. I argue this proposal satisfactorily resolves the skeptical puzzle.},
author = {Jackson, Alexander},
doi = {10.1007/s11098-015-0445-x},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Jackson - 2015 - How you know you are not a brain in a vat.pdf:pdf},
issn = {0031-8116},
journal = {Philosophical Studies},
number = {10},
pages = {2799--2822},
title = {{How you know you are not a brain in a vat}},
url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11098-015-0445-x},
volume = {172},
year = {2015}
}
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