Hallucinating real things. James, S. Synthese, 191(15):3711–3732, 2014.
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No particular dagger was the object of Macbeth's hallucination of a dagger. In contrast, when he hallucinated his former comrade Banquo, Banquo himself was the object of the hallucination. Although philosophers have had much to say about the nature and philosophical import of hallucinations (e.g. Macpherson and Platchias, Hal-lucination, 2013) and object-involving attitudes (e.g. Jeshion, New essays on singular thought, 2010), their intersection has largely been neglected. Yet, object-involving hallucinations raise interesting questions about memory, perception, and the ways in which we have knowledge of the world around us. In this paper, I offer an account of object-involving hallucinations. Specifically, I argue that they are an unusual species of perceptual remembering. In Act II, Scene I of Shakespeare's Macbeth, the titular character has a visual experi-ence as of a dagger floating before him. To Macbeth it was as though his experience was of a particular worldly object. It was not, and much has been done to make sense of this kind of phenomenon. 1 This paper focuses on another kind of hallucination. As Mac-beth descends deeper into madness, he has a visual experience as of his former comrade Banquo, whom he had recently betrayed. Unlike the dagger-hallucination, this visual 1 See e.g. Crane (2011a), Johnston (2004), Smith (2002), Smith (1983), and especially Macpherson (2013) for discussion of the role this kind of hallucination has had in shaping much of contemporary philosophy of perception over the last hundred or so years.
@article{James2014,
abstract = {No particular dagger was the object of Macbeth's hallucination of a dagger. In contrast, when he hallucinated his former comrade Banquo, Banquo himself was the object of the hallucination. Although philosophers have had much to say about the nature and philosophical import of hallucinations (e.g. Macpherson and Platchias, Hal-lucination, 2013) and object-involving attitudes (e.g. Jeshion, New essays on singular thought, 2010), their intersection has largely been neglected. Yet, object-involving hallucinations raise interesting questions about memory, perception, and the ways in which we have knowledge of the world around us. In this paper, I offer an account of object-involving hallucinations. Specifically, I argue that they are an unusual species of perceptual remembering. In Act II, Scene I of Shakespeare's Macbeth, the titular character has a visual experi-ence as of a dagger floating before him. To Macbeth it was as though his experience was of a particular worldly object. It was not, and much has been done to make sense of this kind of phenomenon. 1 This paper focuses on another kind of hallucination. As Mac-beth descends deeper into madness, he has a visual experience as of his former comrade Banquo, whom he had recently betrayed. Unlike the dagger-hallucination, this visual 1 See e.g. Crane (2011a), Johnston (2004), Smith (2002), Smith (1983), and especially Macpherson (2013) for discussion of the role this kind of hallucination has had in shaping much of contemporary philosophy of perception over the last hundred or so years.},
author = {James, Steven},
doi = {10.1007/s11229-014-0492-4},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/James - 2014 - Hallucinating real things(2).pdf:pdf},
issn = {0039-7857},
journal = {Synthese},
number = {15},
pages = {3711--3732},
title = {{Hallucinating real things}},
url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-014-0492-4},
volume = {191},
year = {2014}
}

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