Investigative Support for Information Confidentiality. Jaskolka, J., Khedri, R., & Sabri, K. E. Journal of Ambient Intelligence and Humanized Computing, 6(4):425 – 451, Elsevier, August, 2015.
abstract   bibtex   
With the emergence of computers in daily activities and with the ever-growing complexity of communication networks and protocols, covert channels are becoming an eminent threat to the confidentiality of information. In light of this threat, we propose a technique to detect confidential information leakage via protocol-based covert channels. Although several works examine covert channel detection and analysis from the perspective of information theory by, for instance, analysing channel capacities, we propose a different technique that tackles the problem from a different perspective. The proposed technique takes an algebraic approach using relations. It provides tests to verify the existence of a leakage of information via a monitored covert channel. It also provides computations which show how the information was leaked if a leakage exists. We also report on a prototype tool that allows for the automation of the proposed technique. We limit our focus to protocol-based covert channels and instances where the users of covert channels modulate the information that is being sent; either by encryption, or some other form of encoding. We also discuss possible applications of the proposed technique in digital forensics and cryptanalysis.
@article{JaskolkaKhedriJAIHC2014,
	Abstract = {With the emergence of computers in daily activities and with the ever-growing complexity of communication networks and protocols, covert channels are becoming an eminent threat to the confidentiality of information. In light of this threat, we propose a technique to detect confidential information leakage via protocol-based covert channels. Although several works examine covert channel detection and analysis from the perspective of information theory by, for instance, analysing channel capacities, we propose a different technique that tackles the problem from a different perspective. The proposed technique takes an algebraic approach using relations. It provides tests to verify the existence of a leakage of information via a monitored covert channel. It also provides computations which show how the information was leaked if a leakage exists. We also report on a prototype tool that allows for the automation of the proposed technique.

We limit our focus to protocol-based covert channels and instances where the users of covert channels modulate the information that is being sent; either by encryption, or some other form of encoding. We also discuss possible applications of the proposed technique in digital forensics and cryptanalysis.},
	OPTAnnote = {\\ Submitted: Revision 1690 (\textit{Submitted: December 8, 2014})},
	Author = {Jason Jaskolka and Ridha Khedri and Khair Eddin Sabri},
	Title = {Investigative Support for Information Confidentiality},
	Journal = {Journal of Ambient Intelligence and Humanized Computing},
	Pages = {425 -- 451},
	Publisher = {Elsevier},
	volume = {6},
	number= {4},
	month = {August},
        OPTNote= {(Submitted on December 08, 2014. Accepted on April 26, 2015. To Appear. This paper is an extended version of~[12] and~[13] that has been invited for submission in a Special Issue of the journal.)},
	Year = {2015}
}



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