@conference {Jian:2008:WSP:1409540.1409546,
	title = {Why Share in Peer-to-Peer Networks?},
	booktitle = {EC{\textquoteright}08. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Electronic Commerce},
	series = {ICEC {\textquoteright}08},
	year = {2008},
	month = {08/2008},
	pages = {4:1{\textendash}4:8},
	publisher = {ACM},
	organization = {ACM},
	address = {Innsbruck, Austria},
	abstract = {Prior theory and empirical work emphasize the enormous free-riding problem facing peer-to-peer (P2P) sharing networks. Nonetheless, many P2P networks thrive. We explore two possible explanations that do not rely on altruism or explicit mechanisms imposed on the network: direct and indirect private incentives for the provision of public goods. The direct incentive is a traffic redistribution effect that advantages the sharing peer. We find this incentive is likely insufficient to motivate equilibrium content sharing in large networks. We then approach P2P networks as a graph-theoretic problem and present sufficient conditions for sharing and free-riding to co-exist due to indirect incentives we call generalized reciprocity.},
	keywords = {file-sharing, networks, P2P, peer-to-peer networking},
	isbn = {978-1-60558-075-3},
	doi = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1409540.1409546},
	url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1409540.1409546},
	author = {Jian, Lian and MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K.}
}

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