Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of US Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts. Johannesen, N., Langetieg, P., Reck, D., Risch, M., & Slemrod, J. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 12(3):312–346, 2020.
Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of US Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts [link]Link  doi  abstract   bibtex   
In 2008, the IRS initiated efforts to curb the use of offshore accounts to evade taxes. This paper uses administrative microdata to examine the impact of enforcement efforts on taxpayers' reporting of offshore accounts and income. We find that enforcement caused approximately 50,000 individuals to disclose offshore accounts with a combined value of about $100 billion. Most disclosures happened outside offshore voluntary disclosure programs by individuals who never admitted prior noncompliance. Disclosed accounts were concentrated in countries often characterized as tax havens. Enforcement-driven disclosures increased annual reported capital income by $2–$4 billion, corresponding to $0.6–$1.2 billion in additional tax revenue.
@article{Johannesenetal2020,
  title = {Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of {{US}} Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts},
  author = {Johannesen, Niels and Langetieg, Patrick and Reck, Daniel and Risch, Max and Slemrod, Joel},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {American Economic Journal: Economic Policy},
  volume = {12},
  number = {3},
  pages = {312--346},
  doi = {10.1257/pol.20180410},
  url = {http://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20180410},
  abstract = {In 2008, the IRS initiated efforts to curb the use of offshore accounts to evade taxes. This paper uses administrative microdata to examine the impact of enforcement efforts on taxpayers' reporting of offshore accounts and income. We find that enforcement caused approximately 50,000 individuals to disclose offshore accounts with a combined value of about \$100 billion. Most disclosures happened outside offshore voluntary disclosure programs by individuals who never admitted prior noncompliance. Disclosed accounts were concentrated in countries often characterized as tax havens. Enforcement-driven disclosures increased annual reported capital income by \$2\textendash\$4 billion, corresponding to \$0.6\textendash\$1.2 billion in additional tax revenue.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

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