@conference {Jun:2005:IBI:1080192.1080199,
	title = {Incentives in BitTorrent Induce Free Riding},
	booktitle = {P2PECON{\textquoteright}05. Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems},
	series = {P2PECON {\textquoteright}05},
	year = {2005},
	month = {08/2005},
	pages = {116{\textendash}121},
	publisher = {ACM},
	organization = {ACM},
	address = {Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA},
	abstract = {We investigate the incentive mechanism of BitTorrent, which is a peer-to-peer file distribution system. As downloaders in BitTorrent are faced with the conflict between the eagerness to download and the unwillingness to upload, we relate this problem to the iterated prisoner{\textquoteright}s dilemma, which suggests guidelines to design a good incentive mechanism. Based on these guidelines, we propose a new, simple incentive mechanism. Our analysis and the experimental results using PlanetLab show that the original incentive mechanism of BitTorrent can induce free riding because it is not effective in rewarding and punishing downloaders properly. In contrast, a new mechanism proposed by us is shown to be more robust against free riders.},
	keywords = {BitTorrent, data dissemination, prisoner{\textquoteright}s dilemma, strategy},
	isbn = {1-59593-026-4},
	doi = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1080192.1080199},
	url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1080192.1080199},
	author = {Jun, Seung and Ahamad, Mustaque}
}

{"_id":"kysa6csTxoKRDEBMA","bibbaseid":"jun-ahamad-incentivesinbittorrentinducefreeriding-2005","downloads":0,"creationDate":"2018-07-03T04:50:28.671Z","title":"Incentives in BitTorrent Induce Free Riding","author_short":["Jun, S.","Ahamad, M."],"year":2005,"bibtype":"conference","biburl":"https://gnunet.org/bibliography/export/bibtex","bibdata":{"bibtype":"conference","type":"conference","title":"Incentives in BitTorrent Induce Free Riding","booktitle":"P2PECON\\textquoteright05. Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems","series":"P2PECON \\textquoteright05","year":"2005","month":"08/2005","pages":"116\\textendash121","publisher":"ACM","organization":"ACM","address":"Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA","abstract":"We investigate the incentive mechanism of BitTorrent, which is a peer-to-peer file distribution system. As downloaders in BitTorrent are faced with the conflict between the eagerness to download and the unwillingness to upload, we relate this problem to the iterated prisoner\\textquoterights dilemma, which suggests guidelines to design a good incentive mechanism. Based on these guidelines, we propose a new, simple incentive mechanism. Our analysis and the experimental results using PlanetLab show that the original incentive mechanism of BitTorrent can induce free riding because it is not effective in rewarding and punishing downloaders properly. In contrast, a new mechanism proposed by us is shown to be more robust against free riders.","keywords":"BitTorrent, data dissemination, prisoner\\textquoterights dilemma, strategy","isbn":"1-59593-026-4","doi":"http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1080192.1080199","url":"http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1080192.1080199","author":[{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Jun"],"firstnames":["Seung"],"suffixes":[]},{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Ahamad"],"firstnames":["Mustaque"],"suffixes":[]}],"bibtex":"@conference {Jun:2005:IBI:1080192.1080199,\n\ttitle = {Incentives in BitTorrent Induce Free Riding},\n\tbooktitle = {P2PECON{\\textquoteright}05. Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems},\n\tseries = {P2PECON {\\textquoteright}05},\n\tyear = {2005},\n\tmonth = {08/2005},\n\tpages = {116{\\textendash}121},\n\tpublisher = {ACM},\n\torganization = {ACM},\n\taddress = {Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA},\n\tabstract = {We investigate the incentive mechanism of BitTorrent, which is a peer-to-peer file distribution system. As downloaders in BitTorrent are faced with the conflict between the eagerness to download and the unwillingness to upload, we relate this problem to the iterated prisoner{\\textquoteright}s dilemma, which suggests guidelines to design a good incentive mechanism. Based on these guidelines, we propose a new, simple incentive mechanism. Our analysis and the experimental results using PlanetLab show that the original incentive mechanism of BitTorrent can induce free riding because it is not effective in rewarding and punishing downloaders properly. In contrast, a new mechanism proposed by us is shown to be more robust against free riders.},\n\tkeywords = {BitTorrent, data dissemination, prisoner{\\textquoteright}s dilemma, strategy},\n\tisbn = {1-59593-026-4},\n\tdoi = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1080192.1080199},\n\turl = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1080192.1080199},\n\tauthor = {Jun, Seung and Ahamad, Mustaque}\n}\n","author_short":["Jun, S.","Ahamad, M."],"key":"Jun:2005:IBI:1080192.1080199","id":"Jun:2005:IBI:1080192.1080199","bibbaseid":"jun-ahamad-incentivesinbittorrentinducefreeriding-2005","role":"author","urls":{"Paper":"http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1080192.1080199"},"keyword":["BitTorrent","data dissemination","prisoner\\textquoterights dilemma","strategy"],"downloads":0},"search_terms":["incentives","bittorrent","induce","free","riding","jun","ahamad"],"keywords":["bittorrent","data dissemination","prisoner\\textquoterights dilemma","strategy"],"authorIDs":[],"dataSources":["FWsPTwsmjtrBtRS3B"]}