Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree.

Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree. Kahneman, D. & Klein, G. American Psychologist, 64(6):515–526, 2009.

Paper doi abstract bibtex

This article reports on an effort to explore the differences between two approaches to intuition and expertise that are often viewed as conﬂicting: heuristics and biases (HB) and naturalistic decision making (NDM). Starting from the obvious fact that professional intuition is sometimes marvelous and sometimes ﬂawed, the authors attempt to map the boundary conditions that separate true intuitive skill from overconﬁdent and biased impressions. They conclude that evaluating the likely quality of an intuitive judgment requires an assessment of the predictability of the environment in which the judgment is made and of the individual’s opportunity to learn the regularities of that environment. Subjective experience is not a reliable indicator of judgment accuracy.

@article{kahneman_conditions_2009,
	title = {Conditions for intuitive expertise: {A} failure to disagree.},
	volume = {64},
	issn = {1935-990X, 0003-066X},
	shorttitle = {Conditions for intuitive expertise},
	url = {http://doi.apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi=10.1037/a0016755},
	doi = {10.1037/a0016755},
	abstract = {This article reports on an effort to explore the differences between two approaches to intuition and expertise that are often viewed as conﬂicting: heuristics and biases (HB) and naturalistic decision making (NDM). Starting from the obvious fact that professional intuition is sometimes marvelous and sometimes ﬂawed, the authors attempt to map the boundary conditions that separate true intuitive skill from overconﬁdent and biased impressions. They conclude that evaluating the likely quality of an intuitive judgment requires an assessment of the predictability of the environment in which the judgment is made and of the individual’s opportunity to learn the regularities of that environment. Subjective experience is not a reliable indicator of judgment accuracy.},
	language = {en},
	number = {6},
	urldate = {2023-06-02},
	journal = {American Psychologist},
	author = {Kahneman, Daniel and Klein, Gary},
	year = {2009},
	keywords = {Cognitive biases, Decision making, unread},
	pages = {515--526},
}

Downloads: 0

{"_id":"XMAGfrvzaKerjy9zG","bibbaseid":"kahneman-klein-conditionsforintuitiveexpertiseafailuretodisagree-2009","author_short":["Kahneman, D.","Klein, G."],"bibdata":{"bibtype":"article","type":"article","title":"Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree.","volume":"64","issn":"1935-990X, 0003-066X","shorttitle":"Conditions for intuitive expertise","url":"http://doi.apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi=10.1037/a0016755","doi":"10.1037/a0016755","abstract":"This article reports on an effort to explore the differences between two approaches to intuition and expertise that are often viewed as conﬂicting: heuristics and biases (HB) and naturalistic decision making (NDM). Starting from the obvious fact that professional intuition is sometimes marvelous and sometimes ﬂawed, the authors attempt to map the boundary conditions that separate true intuitive skill from overconﬁdent and biased impressions. They conclude that evaluating the likely quality of an intuitive judgment requires an assessment of the predictability of the environment in which the judgment is made and of the individual’s opportunity to learn the regularities of that environment. Subjective experience is not a reliable indicator of judgment accuracy.","language":"en","number":"6","urldate":"2023-06-02","journal":"American Psychologist","author":[{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Kahneman"],"firstnames":["Daniel"],"suffixes":[]},{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Klein"],"firstnames":["Gary"],"suffixes":[]}],"year":"2009","keywords":"Cognitive biases, Decision making, unread","pages":"515–526","bibtex":"@article{kahneman_conditions_2009,\n\ttitle = {Conditions for intuitive expertise: {A} failure to disagree.},\n\tvolume = {64},\n\tissn = {1935-990X, 0003-066X},\n\tshorttitle = {Conditions for intuitive expertise},\n\turl = {http://doi.apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi=10.1037/a0016755},\n\tdoi = {10.1037/a0016755},\n\tabstract = {This article reports on an effort to explore the differences between two approaches to intuition and expertise that are often viewed as conﬂicting: heuristics and biases (HB) and naturalistic decision making (NDM). Starting from the obvious fact that professional intuition is sometimes marvelous and sometimes ﬂawed, the authors attempt to map the boundary conditions that separate true intuitive skill from overconﬁdent and biased impressions. They conclude that evaluating the likely quality of an intuitive judgment requires an assessment of the predictability of the environment in which the judgment is made and of the individual’s opportunity to learn the regularities of that environment. Subjective experience is not a reliable indicator of judgment accuracy.},\n\tlanguage = {en},\n\tnumber = {6},\n\turldate = {2023-06-02},\n\tjournal = {American Psychologist},\n\tauthor = {Kahneman, Daniel and Klein, Gary},\n\tyear = {2009},\n\tkeywords = {Cognitive biases, Decision making, unread},\n\tpages = {515--526},\n}\n\n","author_short":["Kahneman, D.","Klein, G."],"key":"kahneman_conditions_2009","id":"kahneman_conditions_2009","bibbaseid":"kahneman-klein-conditionsforintuitiveexpertiseafailuretodisagree-2009","role":"author","urls":{"Paper":"http://doi.apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi=10.1037/a0016755"},"keyword":["Cognitive biases","Decision making","unread"],"metadata":{"authorlinks":{}},"html":""},"bibtype":"article","biburl":"https://api.zotero.org/users/9041177/collections/E3RZM4TE/items?key=aBJ5Qagoq1vgfqoLNmjVnZUl&format=bibtex&limit=100","dataSources":["8uJY8jTfcc9uNmCh8"],"keywords":["cognitive biases","decision making","unread"],"search_terms":["conditions","intuitive","expertise","failure","disagree","kahneman","klein"],"title":"Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree.","year":2009}