Knowing from Not Knowing. Kallestrup, J. In Uncovering Facts and Values: Studies in Contemporary Epistemology and Political Philosophy ., of Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, pages 41–55. Brill \textbar Rodopi, Leiden, Kuźniar, Adrian et Odrowąż-Sypniewska, Joanna edition, 2016. ![Knowing from Not Knowing. [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper abstract bibtex Arguments from ignorance are typically fallacious: one shouldn't infer that p is true merely from the fact that p isn,'t known to be false. The reason one cannot invariably come to know that p on the basis of lack of knowledge that not-p is that p may well be false even though one hasn't been in a position to know that not-p. The qualifiers 'typically, and 'invariably, are key here. In cases where one would have known that not-p had p been false, reasoning from ignorance seems perfectly kosher, indeed where one knows that counterfactual independently, one is positioned to gain knowledge. Goldberg (2010a; 2010b) has developed a set of conditions sufficient for such epistemic coverage to obtain in the domain of social epistemology. This paper elaborates, extends and critically discusses Goldberg's pioneering framework.
@incollection{kallestrup_knowing_2016,
address = {Leiden},
edition = {Kuźniar, Adrian et Odrowąż-Sypniewska, Joanna},
series = {Poznań {Studies} in the {Philosophy} of the {Sciences} and the {Humanities}},
title = {Knowing from {Not} {Knowing}.},
isbn = {978-90-04-31265-4},
url = {DOI 10.1163/9789004312654004},
abstract = {Arguments from ignorance are typically fallacious: one shouldn't infer that p is true merely from the fact that p isn,'t known to be false. The reason one cannot invariably come to know that p on the basis of lack of knowledge that not-p is that p may well be false even though one hasn't been in a position to know that not-p. The qualifiers 'typically, and 'invariably, are key here. In cases where one would have known that not-p had p been false, reasoning from ignorance seems perfectly kosher, indeed where one knows that counterfactual independently, one is positioned to gain knowledge. Goldberg (2010a; 2010b) has developed a set of conditions sufficient for such epistemic coverage to obtain in the domain of social epistemology. This paper elaborates, extends and critically discusses Goldberg's pioneering framework.},
language = {en},
booktitle = {Uncovering {Facts} and {Values}: {Studies} in {Contemporary} {Epistemology} and {Political} {Philosophy} .},
publisher = {Brill {\textbar} Rodopi},
author = {Kallestrup, Jesper},
year = {2016},
pages = {41--55},
}
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