Ideal Observer Theories. Kawall, J. In International Encyclopedia of Ethics. American Cancer Society, 2013. ![Ideal Observer Theories [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex Ideal observer theories are metaethical theories according to which the truth of moral judgments is determined by the attitudes of hypothetical ideal observers (see Metaethics; Moral Judgment). Intuitively, ideal observer theorists attempt to characterize ideal observers (henceforth, IOs) with traits that would eliminate common flaws that mar the reactions of ordinary humans. For example, we often seem to go wrong in our moral judgments because we have false beliefs, lack crucial information, are biased in our own favor, inconsistent, and so on. IOs are thus often characterized as being well informed (or even omniscient), impartial, consistent, and empathetic (see Impartiality).
@incollection{kawall_ideal_2013,
title = {Ideal {Observer} {Theories}},
isbn = {978-1-4443-6707-2},
url = {http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee548},
abstract = {Ideal observer theories are metaethical theories according to which the truth of moral judgments is determined by the attitudes of hypothetical ideal observers (see Metaethics; Moral Judgment). Intuitively, ideal observer theorists attempt to characterize ideal observers (henceforth, IOs) with traits that would eliminate common flaws that mar the reactions of ordinary humans. For example, we often seem to go wrong in our moral judgments because we have false beliefs, lack crucial information, are biased in our own favor, inconsistent, and so on. IOs are thus often characterized as being well informed (or even omniscient), impartial, consistent, and empathetic (see Impartiality).},
language = {en},
urldate = {2018-06-24},
booktitle = {International {Encyclopedia} of {Ethics}},
publisher = {American Cancer Society},
author = {Kawall, Jason},
year = {2013},
doi = {10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee548},
keywords = {cognitivism, ethics, impartiality, metaethics, philosophy, realism, value},
}
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