Structured statistical models of inductive reasoning. Kemp, C. & Tenenbaum, J. B Psychol Rev, 116(1):20–58, 2009.
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Everyday inductive inferences are often guided by rich background knowledge. Formal models of induction should aim to incorporate this knowledge and should explain how different kinds of knowledge lead to the distinctive patterns of reasoning found in different inductive contexts. This article presents a Bayesian framework that attempts to meet both goals and describes [corrected] 4 applications of the framework: a taxonomic model, a spatial model, a threshold model, and a causal model. Each model makes probabilistic inferences about the extensions of novel properties, but the priors for the 4 models are defined over different kinds of structures that capture different relationships between the categories in a domain. The framework therefore shows how statistical inference can operate over structured background knowledge, and the authors argue that this interaction between structure and statistics is critical for explaining the power and flexibility of human reasoning.
@Article{Kemp2009,
  author      = {Charles Kemp and Joshua B Tenenbaum},
  journal     = {Psychol Rev},
  title       = {Structured statistical models of inductive reasoning.},
  year        = {2009},
  number      = {1},
  pages       = {20--58},
  volume      = {116},
  abstract    = {Everyday inductive inferences are often guided by rich background
	knowledge. Formal models of induction should aim to incorporate this
	knowledge and should explain how different kinds of knowledge lead
	to the distinctive patterns of reasoning found in different inductive
	contexts. This article presents a Bayesian framework that attempts
	to meet both goals and describes [corrected] 4 applications of the
	framework: a taxonomic model, a spatial model, a threshold model,
	and a causal model. Each model makes probabilistic inferences about
	the extensions of novel properties, but the priors for the 4 models
	are defined over different kinds of structures that capture different
	relationships between the categories in a domain. The framework therefore
	shows how statistical inference can operate over structured background
	knowledge, and the authors argue that this interaction between structure
	and statistics is critical for explaining the power and flexibility
	of human reasoning.},
  doi         = {10.1037/a0014282},
  keywords    = {Association Learning; Bayes Theorem; Concept Formation; Decision Making; Humans; Judgment; Knowledge; Mental Recall; Models, Statistical; Neural Networks (Computer); Problem Solving; Psychological Theory},
  language    = {eng},
  medline-pst = {ppublish},
  pmid        = {19159147},
  school      = {Department of Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University. ckemp@cmu.edu},
  timestamp   = {2011.05.10},
}

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