Historical Memory in Post-Soviet Gothic Society. Khapaeva, D. Social Research: An International Quarterly, 76(1):359–394, 2009. \textlessp\textgreaterVolume 76, Number 1, Spring 2009\textless/p\textgreater![Historical Memory in Post-Soviet Gothic Society [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper abstract bibtex In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Acknowledgement I would like to express my deep gratitude to Gabrielle Spiegel for her comments on the first draft of this text. Notes 1. The opinion poll “History through the Eyes of Russians,” whose aim was to create a portrait of Russian mass historical consciousness, was conducted in July 2007 in three Russian cities—Saint Petersburg, Kazan, and Ulyanovsk—and based on a representative sample of the populace. It was designed to measure changes in the perception of history and, especially, in attitudes towards the Soviet past and Stalinism. The survey was part of a larger research project, “Modernization of History Education in Russia,” that was supported by the MacArthur Foundation. The 2007 poll paralleled the first study of mass historical consciousness conducted by Dina Khapaeva and Nikolai Koposov in July 1990 (Khapaeva and Koposov, 1992: 4–5; Khapaeva, 1993: 4). 2. Twenty-one percent evaluate it “rather negatively”; 16 percent think it “has had no impact”; while 13 percent find it “difficult to answer [the question].” 3. Twenty-one percent evaluate it “rather negatively”; 17 percent think it “has had no impact”; while 17 percent find it “difficult to answer [the question].” 4. The distribution of responses to the question “Choose the statement that reflects best your opinion on Stalin’s role in the history of our country” is as follows: “positive”—16 percent; “rather positive”—18 percent; “rather negative”—18 percent. For attitudes of the Russian youth see Mendelson and Gerber (2005–6: 87). 5. Stalinism was not the only regime that demonstrated a potential to remain in the memory of masses as a myth of a golden age. Theodor Adorno described this sort of memory of German National Socialism, which persisted even into the late sixties. Adorno shows that this memory continued to praise National Socialism because it fulfilled the collective thirst for power of those who had never had any power and who could feel empowered only as members of such a collective body. No analysis, however clear it might be, could spare memory from the reality of these fulfilled phantasms and of the instinctive energies that were invested into National Socialism, concludes Adorno in a pessimistic mood (Adorno, 1971: 14). However, the political conditions in Germany after World War II allowed society to develop a considerable degree of resistance to the legacy of the concentration camp universe. Indeed, the political and social climate in Germany is much less favorable for an upsurge of these “phantasms” than that in Russia. 6. The group of questions on Stalinism was designed as a mixture of typical positive and negative cliches on Stalinism: each positive statement had an exact negative counterpart. The respondents had to evaluate all statements with one of three answers: “yes,” “no,” “hard to say.” Each statement opened with an explicit mention of Stalin: “In Stalin’s time…” 7. This becomes especially evident if we compare the attitudes to the Soviet past among the supporters of different political parties (Khapaeva, 2007). 8. See Ian Buruma (1995). 9. On the Russian historical consciousness during perestroika see Davis (1989) and Nove (1989). 10. On the Western-oriented ideology, see Khapaeva (1994, 1995a, and 2002). On the perception of historical time by Western-oriented Russians in the early nineties, see Khapaeva (1995b: 6). 11. “Yet I persist in believing that the losses—of history, language, homeland, identity—that stand at the center of my personal history were shared by a entire generation in both Europe and United States, and made themselves felt in the need to comfort, in a philosophical displaced form and forum, an epistemological loss of certainty in the truth and utility of history, a loss we no longer could, or cared, to mask beneath the modernist guise of continuity and progress” (Spiegel, 2006: 4). 12. According to another recent opinion poll, 58 percent of respondents think that the victory in Word War II is the most important fact in Russian history; see \textlesshttp://top.rbc.ru/society/21/06/2007/107081.shtml\textgreater. 13. Neprikosnovennyi zapas (Private Stock) is one of Russia’s leading intellectual journals; it is published by the New Literary Review (Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie) publishing house. 14. The idea that World War II was...
@article{khapaeva_historical_2009,
title = {Historical {Memory} in {Post}-{Soviet} {Gothic} {Society}},
volume = {76},
issn = {1944-768X},
url = {http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/social_research/v076/76.1.khapaeva.html},
abstract = {In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Acknowledgement I would like to express my deep gratitude to Gabrielle Spiegel for her comments on the first draft of this text. Notes 1. The opinion poll “History through the Eyes of Russians,” whose aim was to create a portrait of Russian mass historical consciousness, was conducted in July 2007 in three Russian cities—Saint Petersburg, Kazan, and Ulyanovsk—and based on a representative sample of the populace. It was designed to measure changes in the perception of history and, especially, in attitudes towards the Soviet past and Stalinism. The survey was part of a larger research project, “Modernization of History Education in Russia,” that was supported by the MacArthur Foundation. The 2007 poll paralleled the first study of mass historical consciousness conducted by Dina Khapaeva and Nikolai Koposov in July 1990 (Khapaeva and Koposov, 1992: 4–5; Khapaeva, 1993: 4). 2. Twenty-one percent evaluate it “rather negatively”; 16 percent think it “has had no impact”; while 13 percent find it “difficult to answer [the question].” 3. Twenty-one percent evaluate it “rather negatively”; 17 percent think it “has had no impact”; while 17 percent find it “difficult to answer [the question].” 4. The distribution of responses to the question “Choose the statement that reflects best your opinion on Stalin’s role in the history of our country” is as follows: “positive”—16 percent; “rather positive”—18 percent; “rather negative”—18 percent. For attitudes of the Russian youth see Mendelson and Gerber (2005–6: 87). 5. Stalinism was not the only regime that demonstrated a potential to remain in the memory of masses as a myth of a golden age. Theodor Adorno described this sort of memory of German National Socialism, which persisted even into the late sixties. Adorno shows that this memory continued to praise National Socialism because it fulfilled the collective thirst for power of those who had never had any power and who could feel empowered only as members of such a collective body. No analysis, however clear it might be, could spare memory from the reality of these fulfilled phantasms and of the instinctive energies that were invested into National Socialism, concludes Adorno in a pessimistic mood (Adorno, 1971: 14). However, the political conditions in Germany after World War II allowed society to develop a considerable degree of resistance to the legacy of the concentration camp universe. Indeed, the political and social climate in Germany is much less favorable for an upsurge of these “phantasms” than that in Russia. 6. The group of questions on Stalinism was designed as a mixture of typical positive and negative cliches on Stalinism: each positive statement had an exact negative counterpart. The respondents had to evaluate all statements with one of three answers: “yes,” “no,” “hard to say.” Each statement opened with an explicit mention of Stalin: “In Stalin’s time…” 7. This becomes especially evident if we compare the attitudes to the Soviet past among the supporters of different political parties (Khapaeva, 2007). 8. See Ian Buruma (1995). 9. On the Russian historical consciousness during perestroika see Davis (1989) and Nove (1989). 10. On the Western-oriented ideology, see Khapaeva (1994, 1995a, and 2002). On the perception of historical time by Western-oriented Russians in the early nineties, see Khapaeva (1995b: 6). 11. “Yet I persist in believing that the losses—of history, language, homeland, identity—that stand at the center of my personal history were shared by a entire generation in both Europe and United States, and made themselves felt in the need to comfort, in a philosophical displaced form and forum, an epistemological loss of certainty in the truth and utility of history, a loss we no longer could, or cared, to mask beneath the modernist guise of continuity and progress” (Spiegel, 2006: 4). 12. According to another recent opinion poll, 58 percent of respondents think that the victory in Word War II is the most important fact in Russian history; see {\textless}http://top.rbc.ru/society/21/06/2007/107081.shtml{\textgreater}. 13. Neprikosnovennyi zapas (Private Stock) is one of Russia’s leading intellectual journals; it is published by the New Literary Review (Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie) publishing house. 14. The idea that World War II was...},
number = {1},
urldate = {2014-02-13TZ},
journal = {Social Research: An International Quarterly},
author = {Khapaeva, Dina},
year = {2009},
note = {{\textless}p{\textgreater}Volume 76, Number 1, Spring 2009{\textless}/p{\textgreater}},
keywords = {WWII},
pages = {359--394}
}
Downloads: 0
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The survey was part of a larger research project, “Modernization of History Education in Russia,” that was supported by the MacArthur Foundation. The 2007 poll paralleled the first study of mass historical consciousness conducted by Dina Khapaeva and Nikolai Koposov in July 1990 (Khapaeva and Koposov, 1992: 4–5; Khapaeva, 1993: 4). 2. Twenty-one percent evaluate it “rather negatively”; 16 percent think it “has had no impact”; while 13 percent find it “difficult to answer [the question].” 3. Twenty-one percent evaluate it “rather negatively”; 17 percent think it “has had no impact”; while 17 percent find it “difficult to answer [the question].” 4. The distribution of responses to the question “Choose the statement that reflects best your opinion on Stalin’s role in the history of our country” is as follows: “positive”—16 percent; “rather positive”—18 percent; “rather negative”—18 percent. For attitudes of the Russian youth see Mendelson and Gerber (2005–6: 87). 5. Stalinism was not the only regime that demonstrated a potential to remain in the memory of masses as a myth of a golden age. Theodor Adorno described this sort of memory of German National Socialism, which persisted even into the late sixties. Adorno shows that this memory continued to praise National Socialism because it fulfilled the collective thirst for power of those who had never had any power and who could feel empowered only as members of such a collective body. No analysis, however clear it might be, could spare memory from the reality of these fulfilled phantasms and of the instinctive energies that were invested into National Socialism, concludes Adorno in a pessimistic mood (Adorno, 1971: 14). However, the political conditions in Germany after World War II allowed society to develop a considerable degree of resistance to the legacy of the concentration camp universe. Indeed, the political and social climate in Germany is much less favorable for an upsurge of these “phantasms” than that in Russia. 6. The group of questions on Stalinism was designed as a mixture of typical positive and negative cliches on Stalinism: each positive statement had an exact negative counterpart. The respondents had to evaluate all statements with one of three answers: “yes,” “no,” “hard to say.” Each statement opened with an explicit mention of Stalin: “In Stalin’s time…” 7. This becomes especially evident if we compare the attitudes to the Soviet past among the supporters of different political parties (Khapaeva, 2007). 8. See Ian Buruma (1995). 9. On the Russian historical consciousness during perestroika see Davis (1989) and Nove (1989). 10. On the Western-oriented ideology, see Khapaeva (1994, 1995a, and 2002). On the perception of historical time by Western-oriented Russians in the early nineties, see Khapaeva (1995b: 6). 11. “Yet I persist in believing that the losses—of history, language, homeland, identity—that stand at the center of my personal history were shared by a entire generation in both Europe and United States, and made themselves felt in the need to comfort, in a philosophical displaced form and forum, an epistemological loss of certainty in the truth and utility of history, a loss we no longer could, or cared, to mask beneath the modernist guise of continuity and progress” (Spiegel, 2006: 4). 12. According to another recent opinion poll, 58 percent of respondents think that the victory in Word War II is the most important fact in Russian history; see \\textlesshttp://top.rbc.ru/society/21/06/2007/107081.shtml\\textgreater. 13. 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Notes 1. The opinion poll “History through the Eyes of Russians,” whose aim was to create a portrait of Russian mass historical consciousness, was conducted in July 2007 in three Russian cities—Saint Petersburg, Kazan, and Ulyanovsk—and based on a representative sample of the populace. It was designed to measure changes in the perception of history and, especially, in attitudes towards the Soviet past and Stalinism. The survey was part of a larger research project, “Modernization of History Education in Russia,” that was supported by the MacArthur Foundation. The 2007 poll paralleled the first study of mass historical consciousness conducted by Dina Khapaeva and Nikolai Koposov in July 1990 (Khapaeva and Koposov, 1992: 4–5; Khapaeva, 1993: 4). 2. Twenty-one percent evaluate it “rather negatively”; 16 percent think it “has had no impact”; while 13 percent find it “difficult to answer [the question].” 3. Twenty-one percent evaluate it “rather negatively”; 17 percent think it “has had no impact”; while 17 percent find it “difficult to answer [the question].” 4. The distribution of responses to the question “Choose the statement that reflects best your opinion on Stalin’s role in the history of our country” is as follows: “positive”—16 percent; “rather positive”—18 percent; “rather negative”—18 percent. For attitudes of the Russian youth see Mendelson and Gerber (2005–6: 87). 5. Stalinism was not the only regime that demonstrated a potential to remain in the memory of masses as a myth of a golden age. Theodor Adorno described this sort of memory of German National Socialism, which persisted even into the late sixties. Adorno shows that this memory continued to praise National Socialism because it fulfilled the collective thirst for power of those who had never had any power and who could feel empowered only as members of such a collective body. No analysis, however clear it might be, could spare memory from the reality of these fulfilled phantasms and of the instinctive energies that were invested into National Socialism, concludes Adorno in a pessimistic mood (Adorno, 1971: 14). However, the political conditions in Germany after World War II allowed society to develop a considerable degree of resistance to the legacy of the concentration camp universe. Indeed, the political and social climate in Germany is much less favorable for an upsurge of these “phantasms” than that in Russia. 6. The group of questions on Stalinism was designed as a mixture of typical positive and negative cliches on Stalinism: each positive statement had an exact negative counterpart. The respondents had to evaluate all statements with one of three answers: “yes,” “no,” “hard to say.” Each statement opened with an explicit mention of Stalin: “In Stalin’s time…” 7. This becomes especially evident if we compare the attitudes to the Soviet past among the supporters of different political parties (Khapaeva, 2007). 8. See Ian Buruma (1995). 9. On the Russian historical consciousness during perestroika see Davis (1989) and Nove (1989). 10. On the Western-oriented ideology, see Khapaeva (1994, 1995a, and 2002). On the perception of historical time by Western-oriented Russians in the early nineties, see Khapaeva (1995b: 6). 11. “Yet I persist in believing that the losses—of history, language, homeland, identity—that stand at the center of my personal history were shared by a entire generation in both Europe and United States, and made themselves felt in the need to comfort, in a philosophical displaced form and forum, an epistemological loss of certainty in the truth and utility of history, a loss we no longer could, or cared, to mask beneath the modernist guise of continuity and progress” (Spiegel, 2006: 4). 12. 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