Game Theoretic Framework for Power Control in InterCell Interference Coordination. Khawam, K., Adouane, A., Lahoud, S., Tohme, S., & Cohen, J. In IFIP Networking 2014 Conference (Networking 2014), Trondheim, Norway, June, 2014.
abstract   bibtex   
Inter-Cell Interference Coordination (ICIC) is commonly identified as a key radio resource management mechanism to enhance system performance of 4G networks. This paper addresses the problem of ICIC in the downlink of cellular OFDMA systems where the power level selection process of resource blocks (RBs) is apprehended as a sub-modular game. The existence of Nash equilibriums (NE) for that type of games shows that stable power allocations can be reached by selfish Base Stations (BS). We put forward a semi distributed algorithm based on best response dynamics to attain the NEs of the modeled game. Based on local knowledge conveyed by the X2 interface in LTE (Long Term Evolution) networks, each BS will first select a pool of favorable RBs with low interference. Second, each BS will strive to fix the power level adequately on those selected RBs realizing performances comparable with the Max Power policy that uses full power on selected RBs while achieving substantial power economy. Finally, we compare the obtained results to an optimal global solution to quantify the efficiency loss of the distributed game approach. It turns out that even though the distributed game results are sub-optimal, the low degree of system complexity and the inherent adaptability make the decentralized approach promising especially for dynamic scenarios.
@inproceedings{ khawam:2014az,
  abstract = {Inter-Cell Interference Coordination (ICIC) is commonly
		  identified as a key radio resource management mechanism to
		  enhance system performance of 4G networks. This paper
		  addresses the problem of ICIC in the downlink of cellular
		  OFDMA systems where the power level selection process of
		  resource blocks (RBs) is apprehended as a sub-modular game.
		  The existence of Nash equilibriums (NE) for that type of
		  games shows that stable power allocations can be reached by
		  selfish Base Stations (BS). We put forward a semi
		  distributed algorithm based on best response dynamics to
		  attain the NEs of the modeled game. Based on local
		  knowledge conveyed by the X2 interface in LTE (Long Term
		  Evolution) networks, each BS will first select a pool of
		  favorable RBs with low interference. Second, each BS will
		  strive to fix the power level adequately on those selected
		  RBs realizing performances comparable with the Max Power
		  policy that uses full power on selected RBs while achieving
		  substantial power economy. Finally, we compare the obtained
		  results to an optimal global solution to quantify the
		  efficiency loss of the distributed game approach. It turns
		  out that even though the distributed game results are
		  sub-optimal, the low degree of system complexity and the
		  inherent adaptability make the decentralized approach
		  promising especially for dynamic scenarios.},
  address = {Trondheim, Norway},
  author = {Kinda Khawam and Amine Adouane and Samer Lahoud and Samir
		  Tohme and Johanne Cohen},
  booktitle = {IFIP Networking 2014 Conference (Networking 2014)},
  days = {2},
  keywords = {Power Control, non cooperative game theory, inter cell
		  interference coordination},
  month = {June},
  pdf = {https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/45967765/Publications/networking-14.pdf},
  title = {Game Theoretic Framework for Power Control in {InterCell}
		  Interference Coordination},
  year = {2014}
}

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