@article{Klein2014,
abstract = {In this paper I examine the concept of cross-temporal personal identity (diachronicity). This particular form of identity has vexed theorists for centuries-e.g., how can a person maintain a belief in the sameness of self over time in the face of continual psychological and physical change? I first discuss various forms of the sameness relation and the criteria that justify their application. I then examine philosophical and psychological treatments of personal diachronicity (for example, Locke's psychological connectedness theory; the role of episodic memory) and find each lacking on logical grounds, empirical grounds or both. I conclude that to achieve a successful resolution of the issue of the self as a temporal continuant we need to draw a sharp distinction between the feeling of the sameness of one's self and the evidence marshaled in support of that feeling.},
author = {Klein, Stanley B.},
doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00029},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Klein - 2014 - Sameness and the self Philosophical and psychological considerations.pdf:pdf},
issn = {1664-1078},
journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
pages = {29},
pmid = {24523707},
title = {{Sameness and the self: Philosophical and psychological considerations}},
url = {http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00029/abstract},
volume = {5},
year = {2014}
}

{"_id":"Qa5jbjYcj2vpMg7mH","bibbaseid":"klein-samenessandtheselfphilosophicalandpsychologicalconsiderations-2014","downloads":0,"creationDate":"2019-01-05T09:36:46.694Z","title":"Sameness and the self: Philosophical and psychological considerations","author_short":["Klein, S. B."],"year":2014,"bibtype":"article","biburl":"http://phil-mem.org/phil-mem.bib/","bibdata":{"bibtype":"article","type":"article","abstract":"In this paper I examine the concept of cross-temporal personal identity (diachronicity). This particular form of identity has vexed theorists for centuries-e.g., how can a person maintain a belief in the sameness of self over time in the face of continual psychological and physical change? I first discuss various forms of the sameness relation and the criteria that justify their application. I then examine philosophical and psychological treatments of personal diachronicity (for example, Locke's psychological connectedness theory; the role of episodic memory) and find each lacking on logical grounds, empirical grounds or both. I conclude that to achieve a successful resolution of the issue of the self as a temporal continuant we need to draw a sharp distinction between the feeling of the sameness of one's self and the evidence marshaled in support of that feeling.","author":[{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Klein"],"firstnames":["Stanley","B."],"suffixes":[]}],"doi":"10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00029","file":":Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Klein - 2014 - Sameness and the self Philosophical and psychological considerations.pdf:pdf","issn":"1664-1078","journal":"Frontiers in Psychology","pages":"29","pmid":"24523707","title":"Sameness and the self: Philosophical and psychological considerations","url":"http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00029/abstract","volume":"5","year":"2014","bibtex":"@article{Klein2014,\nabstract = {In this paper I examine the concept of cross-temporal personal identity (diachronicity). This particular form of identity has vexed theorists for centuries-e.g., how can a person maintain a belief in the sameness of self over time in the face of continual psychological and physical change? I first discuss various forms of the sameness relation and the criteria that justify their application. I then examine philosophical and psychological treatments of personal diachronicity (for example, Locke's psychological connectedness theory; the role of episodic memory) and find each lacking on logical grounds, empirical grounds or both. I conclude that to achieve a successful resolution of the issue of the self as a temporal continuant we need to draw a sharp distinction between the feeling of the sameness of one's self and the evidence marshaled in support of that feeling.},\nauthor = {Klein, Stanley B.},\ndoi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00029},\nfile = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Klein - 2014 - Sameness and the self Philosophical and psychological considerations.pdf:pdf},\nissn = {1664-1078},\njournal = {Frontiers in Psychology},\npages = {29},\npmid = {24523707},\ntitle = {{Sameness and the self: Philosophical and psychological considerations}},\nurl = {http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00029/abstract},\nvolume = {5},\nyear = {2014}\n}\n","author_short":["Klein, S. B."],"key":"Klein2014","id":"Klein2014","bibbaseid":"klein-samenessandtheselfphilosophicalandpsychologicalconsiderations-2014","role":"author","urls":{"Paper":"http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00029/abstract"},"downloads":0},"search_terms":["sameness","self","philosophical","psychological","considerations","klein"],"keywords":["identity of self","memory","personal diachronicity","self","temporal continuity"],"authorIDs":[],"dataSources":["xpm4HPGis5kQeHY7z"]}