Short Paper: Attacking and Defending Lightweight PHY Security Schemes for Wireless Communications

Short Paper: Attacking and Defending Lightweight PHY Security Schemes for Wireless Communications. Kolokotronis, N., Katsiotis, A., & Kalouptsidis, N. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless & Mobile Networks (WiSec), pages 177-182, 2014. ACM.

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This paper investigates the security offered by PHY schemes that are well oriented towards jointly providing security and protection form channel errors. In particular, we focus on constructions that were recently proposed in the literature, whose security relies on the secrecy of parameters defining the encoding/decoding process of convolutional codes. Such schemes were shown to be quite promising in terms of error correcting capabilities, but no security analysis was provided to justify their use for wireless communications. To this end, we evaluate the strength of the PHY security scheme against chosen plaintext attacks, as well as known plaintext attacks that are built upon an extension of the known algorithm of Blum, Kalai, and Wasserman. The security analysis derives the parameters to be used for achieving a high security level against such type of attacks with low encoding and decoding complexity.

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 bibtype = {inProceedings},
 author = {Kolokotronis, Nicholas and Katsiotis, Alexandros and Kalouptsidis, Nicholas},
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