Are all beliefs equal? Implicit belief attributions recruiting core brain regions of theory of mind. Kovács, A. M., Kühn, S., Gergely, G., Csibra, G., & Brass, M. PLoS One, 9(9):e106558, 2014. doi abstract bibtex Humans possess efficient mechanisms to behave adaptively in social contexts. They ascribe goals and beliefs to others and use these for behavioural predictions. Researchers argued for two separate mental attribution systems: an implicit and automatic one involved in online interactions, and an explicit one mainly used in offline deliberations. However, the underlying mechanisms of these systems and the types of beliefs represented in the implicit system are still unclear. Using neuroimaging methods, we show that the right temporo-parietal junction and the medial prefrontal cortex, brain regions consistently found to be involved in explicit mental state reasoning, are also recruited by spontaneous belief tracking. While the medial prefrontal cortex was more active when both the participant and another agent believed an object to be at a specific location, the right temporo-parietal junction was selectively activated during tracking the false beliefs of another agent about the presence, but not the absence of objects. While humans can explicitly attribute to a conspecific any possible belief they themselves can entertain, implicit belief tracking seems to be restricted to beliefs with specific contents, a content selectivity that may reflect a crucial functional characteristic and signature property of implicit belief attribution.
@Article{Kovacs2014,
author = {Kov\'acs, Agnes Melinda and K\"uhn, Simone and Gergely, Gy\"orgy and Csibra, Gergely and Brass, Marcel},
journal = {PLoS One},
title = {Are all beliefs equal? Implicit belief attributions recruiting core brain regions of theory of mind.},
year = {2014},
number = {9},
pages = {e106558},
volume = {9},
abstract = {Humans possess efficient mechanisms to behave adaptively in social
contexts. They ascribe goals and beliefs to others and use these
for behavioural predictions. Researchers argued for two separate
mental attribution systems: an implicit and automatic one involved
in online interactions, and an explicit one mainly used in offline
deliberations. However, the underlying mechanisms of these systems
and the types of beliefs represented in the implicit system are still
unclear. Using neuroimaging methods, we show that the right temporo-parietal
junction and the medial prefrontal cortex, brain regions consistently
found to be involved in explicit mental state reasoning, are also
recruited by spontaneous belief tracking. While the medial prefrontal
cortex was more active when both the participant and another agent
believed an object to be at a specific location, the right temporo-parietal
junction was selectively activated during tracking the false beliefs
of another agent about the presence, but not the absence of objects.
While humans can explicitly attribute to a conspecific any possible
belief they themselves can entertain, implicit belief tracking seems
to be restricted to beliefs with specific contents, a content selectivity
that may reflect a crucial functional characteristic and signature
property of implicit belief attribution.},
doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0106558},
language = {eng},
medline-pst = {epublish},
pmid = {25259625},
school = {Department of Experimental Psychology and Ghent Institute of Functional and Metabolic Imaging, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium; Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.},
timestamp = {2014.11.15},
}
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They ascribe goals and beliefs to others and use these for behavioural predictions. Researchers argued for two separate mental attribution systems: an implicit and automatic one involved in online interactions, and an explicit one mainly used in offline deliberations. However, the underlying mechanisms of these systems and the types of beliefs represented in the implicit system are still unclear. Using neuroimaging methods, we show that the right temporo-parietal junction and the medial prefrontal cortex, brain regions consistently found to be involved in explicit mental state reasoning, are also recruited by spontaneous belief tracking. While the medial prefrontal cortex was more active when both the participant and another agent believed an object to be at a specific location, the right temporo-parietal junction was selectively activated during tracking the false beliefs of another agent about the presence, but not the absence of objects. 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Implicit belief attributions recruiting core brain regions of theory of mind.},\n year = {2014},\n number = {9},\n pages = {e106558},\n volume = {9},\n abstract = {Humans possess efficient mechanisms to behave adaptively in social\n\tcontexts. They ascribe goals and beliefs to others and use these\n\tfor behavioural predictions. Researchers argued for two separate\n\tmental attribution systems: an implicit and automatic one involved\n\tin online interactions, and an explicit one mainly used in offline\n\tdeliberations. However, the underlying mechanisms of these systems\n\tand the types of beliefs represented in the implicit system are still\n\tunclear. Using neuroimaging methods, we show that the right temporo-parietal\n\tjunction and the medial prefrontal cortex, brain regions consistently\n\tfound to be involved in explicit mental state reasoning, are also\n\trecruited by spontaneous belief tracking. While the medial prefrontal\n\tcortex was more active when both the participant and another agent\n\tbelieved an object to be at a specific location, the right temporo-parietal\n\tjunction was selectively activated during tracking the false beliefs\n\tof another agent about the presence, but not the absence of objects.\n\tWhile humans can explicitly attribute to a conspecific any possible\n\tbelief they themselves can entertain, implicit belief tracking seems\n\tto be restricted to beliefs with specific contents, a content selectivity\n\tthat may reflect a crucial functional characteristic and signature\n\tproperty of implicit belief attribution.},\n doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0106558},\n language = {eng},\n medline-pst = {epublish},\n pmid = {25259625},\n school = {Department of Experimental Psychology and Ghent Institute of Functional and Metabolic Imaging, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium; Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.},\n timestamp = {2014.11.15},\n}\n\n","author_short":["Kovács, A. 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