A logic for factive ignorance. Kubyshkina, E. & Petrolo, M. Synthese, 198(6):5917–5928, June, 2021. doi abstract bibtex In the current debate there are two epistemological approaches to the definition of ignorance: the Standard View and the New View. The former defines ignorance simply as not knowing, while the latter defines it as the absence of true belief. One of the main differences between these two positions lies in rejecting (Standard View) or in accepting (New View) the factivity of ignorance, i.e., if an agent is ignorant of $$\phi $$, then $$\phi $$is true. In the present article, we first provide a criticism of the Standard View in favour of the New View. Secondly, we propose a formal setting to represent the notion of factive ignorance.
@article{kubyshkina_logic_2021,
title = {A logic for factive ignorance},
volume = {198},
doi = {10.1007/s11229-019-02440-1},
abstract = {In the current debate there are two epistemological approaches to the definition of ignorance: the Standard View and the New View. The former defines ignorance simply as not knowing, while the latter defines it as the absence of true belief. One of the main differences between these two positions lies in rejecting (Standard View) or in accepting (New View) the factivity of ignorance, i.e., if an agent is ignorant of \$\${\textbackslash}phi \$\$, then \$\${\textbackslash}phi \$\$is true. In the present article, we first provide a criticism of the Standard View in favour of the New View. Secondly, we propose a formal setting to represent the notion of factive ignorance.},
number = {6},
journal = {Synthese},
author = {Kubyshkina, Ekaterina and Petrolo, Mattia},
month = jun,
year = {2021},
keywords = {Agnoiology, Epistemic logic, Factive ignorance, Ignorance representation},
pages = {5917--5928},
}
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