What ignorance could not be. Kubyshkina, E. & Petrolo, M. Principia, 24(2):247–254, 2020.
doi  abstract   bibtex   
In the current debate there are two epistemological approaches to the definition of ignorance. The Standard View defines ignorance simply as not knowing, while the New View defines it as the absence of true belief. We argue that both views provide necessary, but not sufficient conditions for ignorance, and thus do not constitute satisfactory definitions for such a notion. © 2020 The author(s).
@article{kubyshkina_what_2020,
	title = {What ignorance could not be},
	volume = {24},
	doi = {10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n2p247},
	abstract = {In the current debate there are two epistemological approaches to the definition of ignorance. The Standard View defines ignorance simply as not knowing, while the New View defines it as the absence of true belief. We argue that both views provide necessary, but not sufficient conditions for ignorance, and thus do not constitute satisfactory definitions for such a notion. © 2020 The author(s).},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Principia},
	author = {Kubyshkina, E. and Petrolo, M.},
	year = {2020},
	keywords = {Definition of ignorance, Ignorance, Ignorance in history and philosophy of science and technology - general information, Mental state, New view of ignorance, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Standard view of ignorance},
	pages = {247--254},
}

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