Truth and ignorance. Kyle, B. Synthese, 2020.
doi  abstract   bibtex   
I argue that the Standard View of ignorance is at odds with the claim that knowledge entails truth. In particular, if knowledge entails truth then we cannot explain away some apparent absurdities that arise from the Standard View of ignorance. I then discuss a modified version of the Standard View, which simply adds a truth requirement to the original Standard View. I show that the two main arguments for the original Standard View fail to support this modified view. © 2020, Springer Nature B.V.
@article{kyle_truth_2020,
	title = {Truth and ignorance},
	doi = {10.1007/s11229-020-02546-x},
	abstract = {I argue that the Standard View of ignorance is at odds with the claim that knowledge entails truth. In particular, if knowledge entails truth then we cannot explain away some apparent absurdities that arise from the Standard View of ignorance. I then discuss a modified version of the Standard View, which simply adds a truth requirement to the original Standard View. I show that the two main arguments for the original Standard View fail to support this modified view. © 2020, Springer Nature B.V.},
	journal = {Synthese},
	author = {Kyle, B.G.},
	year = {2020},
	keywords = {Ignorance, Knowledge, New view of ignorance, Standard view of ignorance, Truth},
}

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