Incentives for Cooperation in Peer-to-Peer Networks. Lai, K., Feldman, M., Stoica, I., & Chuang, J. 06/2003 2003.
Incentives for Cooperation in Peer-to-Peer Networks [link]Paper  abstract   bibtex   
this paper, our contributions are to generalize from the traditional symmetric EPD to the asymmetric transactions of P2P applications, map out the design space of EPD-based incentive techniques, and simulate a subset of these techniques. Our findings are as follows: Incentive techniques relying on private history (where entites only use their private histories of entities\textquoteright actions) fail as the population size increases.
@conference {Lai03incentivesfor,
	title = {Incentives for Cooperation in Peer-to-Peer Networks},
	booktitle = {P2PECON. Proceedings of the First Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems},
	year = {2003},
	month = {06/2003},
	address = {Berkeley, California, USA},
	abstract = {this paper, our contributions are to generalize from the traditional symmetric EPD to the asymmetric transactions of P2P applications, map out the design space of EPD-based incentive techniques, and simulate a subset of these techniques. Our findings are as follows: Incentive techniques relying on private history (where entites only use their private histories of entities{\textquoteright} actions) fail as the population size increases.},
	keywords = {P2P, privacy},
	url = {http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.14.1949},
	author = {Kevin Lai and Michal Feldman and Ion Stoica and John Chuang}
}

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