When ignorance excuses. Le Morvan, P. Ratio, 32(1):22–31, 2019.
doi  abstract   bibtex   
An ingenious argument – we may call it the Argument from Excuse – purports to show that the Standard View of Ignorance is false and the New View of Ignorance is true. On the former, ignorance is lack of knowledge; on the latter, ignorance is lack of true belief. I defend the Standard View by arguing that the Argument from Excuse is unsound. I also argue that an implication of my case is that Factual Ignorance Thesis (FIT) is false. According to FIT, whenever an agent A acts from factual ignorance, A is morally blameworthy (culpable) for the act only if A is morally blameworthy (culpable) for the ignorance from which A acts.
@article{le_morvan_when_2019,
	title = {When ignorance excuses},
	volume = {32},
	doi = {10.1111/rati.12212},
	abstract = {An ingenious argument – we may call it the Argument from Excuse – purports to show that the Standard View of Ignorance is false and the New View of Ignorance is true. On the former, ignorance is lack of knowledge; on the latter, ignorance is lack of true belief. I defend the Standard View by arguing that the Argument from Excuse is unsound. I also argue that an implication of my case is that Factual Ignorance Thesis (FIT) is false. According to FIT, whenever an agent A acts from factual ignorance, A is morally blameworthy (culpable) for the act only if A is morally blameworthy (culpable) for the ignorance from which A acts.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Ratio},
	author = {Le Morvan, Pierre},
	year = {2019},
	keywords = {Ignorance in history and philosophy of science and technology - general information, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {22--31},
}

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