@article{leuschner_is_2018,
	title = {Is it appropriate to ‘target’ inappropriate dissent? on the normative consequences of climate skepticism},
	volume = {195},
	issn = {1573-0964},
	shorttitle = {Is it appropriate to ‘target’ inappropriate dissent?},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1267-x},
	doi = {10.1007/s11229-016-1267-x},
	abstract = {As Justin Biddle and I have argued, climate skepticism can be epistemically problematic when it displays a systematic intolerance of producer risks at the expense of public risks (Biddle and Leuschner in European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5(3): 261–278, 2015). In this paper, I will provide currently available empirical evidence that supports our account, and I discuss the normative consequences of climate skepticism by drawing upon Philip Kitcher’s “Millian argument against the freedom of inquiry.” Finally, I argue that even though concerns regarding inappropriate disqualification of dissent are reasonable, a form of “targeting” dissent—namely revealing manufactured dissent—is required in order to identify epistemically detrimental dissent and, thus, to protect scientific and public discourse.},
	language = {en},
	number = {3},
	urldate = {2021-02-03},
	journal = {Synthese},
	author = {Leuschner, Anna},
	month = mar,
	year = {2018},
	keywords = {5 Ignorance and manufactured doubt, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {1255--1271},
}

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