@article{Lewis1983,
abstract = {[first paragraph] I shall take dualism to be the thesis that persons are essentially immaterial substances. This means that "having a body" or "being embodied" is to be construed as a nonessential property of personhood. Notice that this does not entail that the existence of a person is a sufficient condition for the existence of every mental state. The thesis is consistent with the claim that there are mental states for which embodiment is a necessary condition. But, as the brain is, so to speak, the "physiological core" of personhood for the materialist, so an immaterial substance is the "psychological core" of personhood for the dualist. I take it that dualism, so understood, entails that a person could exist independent of his or her body. Materialism I shall take to be the thesis that persons just are their bodies or, alternatively, that persons are essentially material substances, which therefore cannot exist in a disembodied state.},
author = {Lewis, Delmas},
doi = {10.2307/2107577},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Lewis - 1983 - Dualism and the causal theory of memory.pdf:pdf},
issn = {00318205},
journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
number = {1},
pages = {21--30},
title = {{Dualism and the causal theory of memory}},
url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/2107577?origin=crossref},
volume = {44},
year = {1983}
}

{"_id":"Ej9qzMSRXW8MZs6zm","bibbaseid":"lewis-dualismandthecausaltheoryofmemory-1983","downloads":0,"creationDate":"2019-01-05T09:36:45.959Z","title":"Dualism and the causal theory of memory","author_short":["Lewis, D."],"year":1983,"bibtype":"article","biburl":"http://phil-mem.org/phil-mem.bib/","bibdata":{"bibtype":"article","type":"article","abstract":"[first paragraph] I shall take dualism to be the thesis that persons are essentially immaterial substances. This means that \"having a body\" or \"being embodied\" is to be construed as a nonessential property of personhood. Notice that this does not entail that the existence of a person is a sufficient condition for the existence of every mental state. The thesis is consistent with the claim that there are mental states for which embodiment is a necessary condition. But, as the brain is, so to speak, the \"physiological core\" of personhood for the materialist, so an immaterial substance is the \"psychological core\" of personhood for the dualist. I take it that dualism, so understood, entails that a person could exist independent of his or her body. Materialism I shall take to be the thesis that persons just are their bodies or, alternatively, that persons are essentially material substances, which therefore cannot exist in a disembodied state.","author":[{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Lewis"],"firstnames":["Delmas"],"suffixes":[]}],"doi":"10.2307/2107577","file":":Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Lewis - 1983 - Dualism and the causal theory of memory.pdf:pdf","issn":"00318205","journal":"Philosophy and Phenomenological Research","number":"1","pages":"21–30","title":"Dualism and the causal theory of memory","url":"https://www.jstor.org/stable/2107577?origin=crossref","volume":"44","year":"1983","bibtex":"@article{Lewis1983,\nabstract = {[first paragraph] I shall take dualism to be the thesis that persons are essentially immaterial substances. This means that \"having a body\" or \"being embodied\" is to be construed as a nonessential property of personhood. Notice that this does not entail that the existence of a person is a sufficient condition for the existence of every mental state. The thesis is consistent with the claim that there are mental states for which embodiment is a necessary condition. But, as the brain is, so to speak, the \"physiological core\" of personhood for the materialist, so an immaterial substance is the \"psychological core\" of personhood for the dualist. I take it that dualism, so understood, entails that a person could exist independent of his or her body. Materialism I shall take to be the thesis that persons just are their bodies or, alternatively, that persons are essentially material substances, which therefore cannot exist in a disembodied state.},\nauthor = {Lewis, Delmas},\ndoi = {10.2307/2107577},\nfile = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Lewis - 1983 - Dualism and the causal theory of memory.pdf:pdf},\nissn = {00318205},\njournal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},\nnumber = {1},\npages = {21--30},\ntitle = {{Dualism and the causal theory of memory}},\nurl = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/2107577?origin=crossref},\nvolume = {44},\nyear = {1983}\n}\n","author_short":["Lewis, D."],"key":"Lewis1983","id":"Lewis1983","bibbaseid":"lewis-dualismandthecausaltheoryofmemory-1983","role":"author","urls":{"Paper":"https://www.jstor.org/stable/2107577?origin=crossref"},"downloads":0},"search_terms":["dualism","causal","theory","memory","lewis"],"keywords":[],"authorIDs":[],"dataSources":["xpm4HPGis5kQeHY7z"]}