Revenue Enhancement Via Asymmetric Signaling in Interdependent-Value Auctions. Li, Z. & Das, S. In Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 2093-2100, 2019. Paper bibtex 6 downloads @inproceedings{li2019signal,
author = {Zhuoshu Li and Sanmay Das},
title = {Revenue Enhancement Via Asymmetric Signaling in Interdependent-Value Auctions},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
pages = {2093-2100},
year = {2019},
url_Paper = {https://cs.gmu.edu/\%7esanmay/papers/aaai2019-signal-structure.pdf},
keywords = {Information Design, Auctions},
}
Downloads: 6
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