Better Not to Know: On the Possibility of Culpable Knowledge. Licon, J. Social Epistemology, 2024. doi abstract bibtex Many philosophers hold there are genuine cases of culpable ignorance. This paper argues that there are conditions that can render knowledge epistemically culpable too. First, we contrast culpable ignorance with morally culpable knowledge. Second, we examine the nature of epistemically culpable knowledge using a key example. We then highlight empirical support for the claim that there are real-world conditions that make epistemically culpable knowledge possible. Next, we survey three kinds of epistemic culpability fostered by culpable knowledge. Finally, we address the benefits objection and argue that it fails. © 2024 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
@article{licon_better_2024,
title = {Better {Not} to {Know}: {On} the {Possibility} of {Culpable} {Knowledge}},
issn = {0269-1728},
shorttitle = {Better {Not} to {Know}},
doi = {10.1080/02691728.2024.2326822},
abstract = {Many philosophers hold there are genuine cases of culpable ignorance. This paper argues that there are conditions that can render knowledge epistemically culpable too. First, we contrast culpable ignorance with morally culpable knowledge. Second, we examine the nature of epistemically culpable knowledge using a key example. We then highlight empirical support for the claim that there are real-world conditions that make epistemically culpable knowledge possible. Next, we survey three kinds of epistemic culpability fostered by culpable knowledge. Finally, we address the benefits objection and argue that it fails. © 2024 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor \& Francis Group.},
language = {English},
journal = {Social Epistemology},
author = {Licon, J.A.},
year = {2024},
keywords = {Epistemic culpability, epistemic injustice, ignorance, signaling},
}
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