Secret Sharing with Binary Shares. Lin, F., Cheraghchi, M., Guruswami, V., Safavi-Naini, R., & Wang, H. In Proceedings of the 10th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS), volume 124, of Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), pages 53:1–53:20, 2019.
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Paper doi abstract bibtex 7 downloads Shamir's celebrated secret sharing scheme provides an efficient method for encoding a secret of arbitrary length $\ell$ among any $N ≤ 2^\ell$ players such that for a threshold parameter $t$, (i) the knowledge of any $t$ shares does not reveal any information about the secret and, (ii) any choice of $t+1$ shares fully reveals the secret. It is known that any such threshold secret sharing scheme necessarily requires shares of length $\ell$, and in this sense Shamir's scheme is optimal. The more general notion of ramp schemes requires the reconstruction of secret from any $t+g$ shares, for a positive integer gap parameter $g$. Ramp secret sharing scheme necessarily requires shares of length $\ell/g$. Other than the bound related to secret length $\ell$, the share lengths of ramp schemes can not go below a quantity that depends only on the gap ratio $g/N$. In this work, we study secret sharing in the extremal case of bit-long shares and arbitrarily small gap ratio $g/N$, where standard ramp secret sharing becomes impossible. We show, however, that a slightly relaxed but equally effective notion of semantic security for the secret, and negligible reconstruction error probability, eliminate the impossibility. Moreover, we provide explicit constructions of such schemes. One of the consequences of our relaxation is that, unlike standard ramp schemes with perfect secrecy, adaptive and non-adaptive adversaries need different analysis and construction. For non-adaptive adversaries, we explicitly construct secret sharing schemes that provide secrecy against any $τ$ fraction of observed shares, and reconstruction from any $ρ$ fraction of shares, for any choices of $0 ≤ τ < ρ ≤ 1$. Our construction achieves secret length $N(ρ-τ-o(1))$, which we show to be optimal. For adaptive adversaries, we construct explicit schemes attaining a secret length $Ω(N(ρ-τ))$. We discuss our results and open questions.
@INPROCEEDINGS{ref:LCGSW19,
author = {Fuchun Lin and Mahdi Cheraghchi and Venkatesan
Guruswami and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini and Huaxiong
Wang},
title = {Secret Sharing with Binary Shares},
year = 2019,
doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2019.53},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 10th {Innovations in Theoretical
Computer Science Conference (ITCS)}},
pages = {53:1--53:20},
series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics
(LIPIcs)},
volume = 124,
url_Link =
{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/frontdoor.php?source_opus=10146},
url_Paper = {https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.02974},
abstract = {Shamir's celebrated secret sharing scheme provides
an efficient method for encoding a secret of
arbitrary length $\ell$ among any $N \leq 2^\ell$
players such that for a threshold parameter $t$, (i)
the knowledge of any $t$ shares does not reveal any
information about the secret and, (ii) any choice of
$t+1$ shares fully reveals the secret. It is known
that any such threshold secret sharing scheme
necessarily requires shares of length $\ell$, and in
this sense Shamir's scheme is optimal. The more
general notion of ramp schemes requires the
reconstruction of secret from any $t+g$ shares, for
a positive integer gap parameter $g$. Ramp secret
sharing scheme necessarily requires shares of length
$\ell/g$. Other than the bound related to secret
length $\ell$, the share lengths of ramp schemes can
not go below a quantity that depends only on the gap
ratio $g/N$. In this work, we study secret sharing
in the extremal case of bit-long shares and
arbitrarily small gap ratio $g/N$, where standard
ramp secret sharing becomes impossible. We show,
however, that a slightly relaxed but equally
effective notion of semantic security for the
secret, and negligible reconstruction error
probability, eliminate the impossibility. Moreover,
we provide explicit constructions of such
schemes. One of the consequences of our relaxation
is that, unlike standard ramp schemes with perfect
secrecy, adaptive and non-adaptive adversaries need
different analysis and construction. For
non-adaptive adversaries, we explicitly construct
secret sharing schemes that provide secrecy against
any $\tau$ fraction of observed shares, and
reconstruction from any $\rho$ fraction of shares,
for any choices of $0 \leq \tau < \rho \leq 1$. Our
construction achieves secret length
$N(\rho-\tau-o(1))$, which we show to be
optimal. For adaptive adversaries, we construct
explicit schemes attaining a secret length
$\Omega(N(\rho-\tau))$. We discuss our results and
open questions. },
keywords = {Secret sharing scheme, Wiretap channel}
}
Downloads: 7
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It is known that any such threshold secret sharing scheme necessarily requires shares of length $\\ell$, and in this sense Shamir's scheme is optimal. The more general notion of ramp schemes requires the reconstruction of secret from any $t+g$ shares, for a positive integer gap parameter $g$. Ramp secret sharing scheme necessarily requires shares of length $\\ell/g$. Other than the bound related to secret length $\\ell$, the share lengths of ramp schemes can not go below a quantity that depends only on the gap ratio $g/N$. In this work, we study secret sharing in the extremal case of bit-long shares and arbitrarily small gap ratio $g/N$, where standard ramp secret sharing becomes impossible. We show, however, that a slightly relaxed but equally effective notion of semantic security for the secret, and negligible reconstruction error probability, eliminate the impossibility. Moreover, we provide explicit constructions of such schemes. One of the consequences of our relaxation is that, unlike standard ramp schemes with perfect secrecy, adaptive and non-adaptive adversaries need different analysis and construction. For non-adaptive adversaries, we explicitly construct secret sharing schemes that provide secrecy against any $τ$ fraction of observed shares, and reconstruction from any $ρ$ fraction of shares, for any choices of $0 ≤ τ < ρ ≤ 1$. Our construction achieves secret length $N(ρ-τ-o(1))$, which we show to be optimal. For adaptive adversaries, we construct explicit schemes attaining a secret length $Ω(N(ρ-τ))$. We discuss our results and open questions. ","keywords":"Secret sharing scheme, Wiretap channel","bibtex":"@INPROCEEDINGS{ref:LCGSW19,\n author =\t {Fuchun Lin and Mahdi Cheraghchi and Venkatesan\n Guruswami and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini and Huaxiong\n Wang},\n title =\t {Secret Sharing with Binary Shares},\n year =\t 2019,\n doi =\t\t {10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2019.53},\n booktitle =\t {Proceedings of the 10th {Innovations in Theoretical\n Computer Science Conference (ITCS)}},\n pages =\t {53:1--53:20},\n series =\t {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics\n (LIPIcs)},\n volume =\t 124,\n url_Link =\n {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/frontdoor.php?source_opus=10146},\n url_Paper =\t {https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.02974},\n abstract =\t {Shamir's celebrated secret sharing scheme provides\n an efficient method for encoding a secret of\n arbitrary length $\\ell$ among any $N \\leq 2^\\ell$\n players such that for a threshold parameter $t$, (i)\n the knowledge of any $t$ shares does not reveal any\n information about the secret and, (ii) any choice of\n $t+1$ shares fully reveals the secret. It is known\n that any such threshold secret sharing scheme\n necessarily requires shares of length $\\ell$, and in\n this sense Shamir's scheme is optimal. The more\n general notion of ramp schemes requires the\n reconstruction of secret from any $t+g$ shares, for\n a positive integer gap parameter $g$. Ramp secret\n sharing scheme necessarily requires shares of length\n $\\ell/g$. Other than the bound related to secret\n length $\\ell$, the share lengths of ramp schemes can\n not go below a quantity that depends only on the gap\n ratio $g/N$. In this work, we study secret sharing\n in the extremal case of bit-long shares and\n arbitrarily small gap ratio $g/N$, where standard\n ramp secret sharing becomes impossible. We show,\n however, that a slightly relaxed but equally\n effective notion of semantic security for the\n secret, and negligible reconstruction error\n probability, eliminate the impossibility. Moreover,\n we provide explicit constructions of such\n schemes. One of the consequences of our relaxation\n is that, unlike standard ramp schemes with perfect\n secrecy, adaptive and non-adaptive adversaries need\n different analysis and construction. For\n non-adaptive adversaries, we explicitly construct\n secret sharing schemes that provide secrecy against\n any $\\tau$ fraction of observed shares, and\n reconstruction from any $\\rho$ fraction of shares,\n for any choices of $0 \\leq \\tau < \\rho \\leq 1$. Our\n construction achieves secret length\n $N(\\rho-\\tau-o(1))$, which we show to be\n optimal. For adaptive adversaries, we construct\n explicit schemes attaining a secret length\n $\\Omega(N(\\rho-\\tau))$. We discuss our results and\n open questions. },\n keywords =\t {Secret sharing scheme, Wiretap channel}\n}\n\n","author_short":["Lin, F.","Cheraghchi, M.","Guruswami, V.","Safavi-Naini, R.","Wang, H."],"key":"ref:LCGSW19","id":"ref:LCGSW19","bibbaseid":"lin-cheraghchi-guruswami-safavinaini-wang-secretsharingwithbinaryshares-2019","role":"author","urls":{" link":"https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/frontdoor.php?source_opus=10146"," paper":"https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.02974"},"keyword":["Secret sharing scheme","Wiretap channel"],"metadata":{"authorlinks":{"cheraghchi, m":"https://mahdi.ch/writings/"}},"downloads":7},"bibtype":"inproceedings","biburl":"http://mahdi.ch/writings/cheraghchi.bib","creationDate":"2020-05-28T19:13:20.841Z","downloads":7,"keywords":["secret sharing scheme","wiretap channel"],"search_terms":["secret","sharing","binary","shares","lin","cheraghchi","guruswami","safavi-naini","wang"],"title":"Secret Sharing with Binary Shares","year":2019,"dataSources":["YZqdBBx6FeYmvQE6D"]}