Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR. Lowe, G. In Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems, of TACAs '96, pages 147--166, London, UK, UK, 1996. Springer-Verlag. 01757 bibtex: Low96 bibtex[acmid=693776;numpages=20]
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR [link]Paper  doi  abstract   bibtex   
In this paper we analyse the well known Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol using FDR, a refinement checker for CSP. We use FDR to discover an attack upon the protocol, which allows an intruder to impersonate another agent. We adapt the protocol, and then use FDR to show that the new protocol is secure, at least for a small system. Finally we prove a result which tells us that if this small system is secure, then so is a system of arbitrary size.
@inproceedings{lowe_breaking_1996,
	address = {London, UK, UK},
	series = {{TACAs} '96},
	title = {Breaking and {Fixing} the {Needham}-{Schroeder} {Public}-{Key} {Protocol} {Using} {FDR}},
	isbn = {3-540-61042-1},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-61042-1_43},
	doi = {10.1007/3-540-61042-1<sub>4</sub>3},
	abstract = {In this paper we analyse the well known Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol using FDR, a refinement checker for CSP. We use FDR to discover an attack upon the protocol, which allows an intruder to impersonate another agent. We adapt the protocol, and then use FDR to show that the new protocol is secure, at least for a small system. Finally we prove a result which tells us that if this small system is secure, then so is a system of arbitrary size.},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the {Second} {International} {Workshop} on {Tools} and {Algorithms} for {Construction} and {Analysis} of {Systems}},
	publisher = {Springer-Verlag},
	author = {Lowe, Gavin},
	year = {1996},
	note = {01757 
bibtex: Low96 
bibtex[acmid=693776;numpages=20]},
	pages = {147--166}
}

Downloads: 0