Shit Happens. Mandik, P. Episteme, 4(2):205–218, June, 2007. Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Paper doi abstract bibtex In this paper I embrace what Brian Keeley calls in “Of Conspiracy Theories” the absurdist horn of the dilemma for philosophers who criticize such theories. I thus defend the view that there is indeed something deeply epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorizing. My complaint is that conspiracy theories apply intentional explanations to situations that give rise to special problems concerning the elimination of competing intentional explanations.
@article{mandik_shit_2007,
title = {Shit {Happens}},
volume = {4},
issn = {1750-0117, 1742-3600},
url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/shit-happens/3B36D7E318904D5E1D513E3A38986F6F},
doi = {10.3366/epi.2007.4.2.205},
abstract = {In this paper I embrace what Brian Keeley calls in “Of Conspiracy Theories” the absurdist horn of the dilemma for philosophers who criticize such theories. I thus defend the view that there is indeed something deeply epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorizing. My complaint is that conspiracy theories apply intentional explanations to situations that give rise to special problems concerning the elimination of competing intentional explanations.},
language = {en},
number = {2},
urldate = {2020-11-18},
journal = {Episteme},
author = {Mandik, Pete},
month = jun,
year = {2007},
note = {Publisher: Cambridge University Press},
pages = {205--218},
}
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