Future mental time travel and the me-self. Manning, L. In Michaelian, K., Klein, S. B., & Szpunar, K. K., editors, Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel, pages 183–198. Oxford University Press, New York, 2016.
abstract   bibtex   
[first paragraph] One of the most frequently cited contributions from James's Principles of Psychology (1890) to the current study of the self is the division of the self into the " I-self, " the self as a knower, and the " Me-self, " the self as known. In general terms, James's I-self and Me-self distinction has been elaborated on and updated to produce present-day theoretical models, but independently of the existing expanded versions, the foundations remain in the groundwork that James laid out. A recent example of updated work based on the division of I-self and Me-self is the sense of self and memory model put forward by Prebble et al. (2013). Within the concept of the Me-self (i.e., the content of self), some of whose characteristics are tackled in the present chapter in relation to episodic future thought, Prebble et al.'s (2013) model includes two functions according to the temporal dimension: the present moment or across time. The self-concept based on Conway's theory (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004b) is the content of the self in the present moment. Its normal functioning allows us to experience a sense of unity in our mental representations of who we are. The content of self across time, on the other hand, allows us to experience semantic continuity. Regarding the relationships between the sense of self and the memory systems, in contrast with the I-self (see section 1) that is exclusively based on episodic autobiographical memory, the Me-self is associated with both semantiticized and episodic autobiographical memory.
@incollection{Manning2016,
abstract = {[first paragraph] One of the most frequently cited contributions from James's Principles of Psychology (1890) to the current study of the self is the division of the self into the " I-self, " the self as a knower, and the " Me-self, " the self as known. In general terms, James's I-self and Me-self distinction has been elaborated on and updated to produce present-day theoretical models, but independently of the existing expanded versions, the foundations remain in the groundwork that James laid out. A recent example of updated work based on the division of I-self and Me-self is the sense of self and memory model put forward by Prebble et al. (2013). Within the concept of the Me-self (i.e., the content of self), some of whose characteristics are tackled in the present chapter in relation to episodic future thought, Prebble et al.'s (2013) model includes two functions according to the temporal dimension: the present moment or across time. The self-concept based on Conway's theory (Conway, 2005; Conway {\&} Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004b) is the content of the self in the present moment. Its normal functioning allows us to experience a sense of unity in our mental representations of who we are. The content of self across time, on the other hand, allows us to experience semantic continuity. Regarding the relationships between the sense of self and the memory systems, in contrast with the I-self (see section 1) that is exclusively based on episodic autobiographical memory, the Me-self is associated with both semantiticized and episodic autobiographical memory.},
address = {New York},
author = {Manning, Lilianne},
booktitle = {Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel},
editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Klein, Stanley B. and Szpunar, Karl K.},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Manning - 2016 - Future mental time travel and the me-self.pdf:pdf},
pages = {183--198},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
title = {{Future mental time travel and the me-self}},
year = {2016}
}
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