A Duty of Ignorance. Matheson, D. Episteme, 10(2):193–205, 2013. Edition: 2013/05/24 Publisher: Cambridge University Press![A Duty of Ignorance [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex Conjoined with the claim that there is a moral right to privacy, each of the major contemporary accounts of privacy implies a duty of ignorance for those against whom the right is held. In this paper I consider and respond to a compelling argument that challenges these accounts (or the claim about a right to privacy) in the light of this implication. A crucial premise of the argument is that we cannot ever be morally obligated to become ignorant of information we currently know. The plausibility of this premise, I suggest, derives from the thought that there are no epistemically ‘non-drastic’ ways in which we can cause ourselves to become ignorant of what we already know. Drawing on some recent work in the epistemology and psychology of self-deception and forgetting, I seek to undermine this thought, and thus provide a defense against the challenging argument, by arguing that there are indeed such ways.
@article{matheson_duty_2013,
title = {A {Duty} of {Ignorance}},
volume = {10},
issn = {1742-3600},
url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/article/duty-of-ignorance/B6FCDA329570AD197A45AFC9B3EADA25},
doi = {10.1017/epi.2013.16},
abstract = {Conjoined with the claim that there is a moral right to privacy, each of the major contemporary accounts of privacy implies a duty of ignorance for those against whom the right is held. In this paper I consider and respond to a compelling argument that challenges these accounts (or the claim about a right to privacy) in the light of this implication. A crucial premise of the argument is that we cannot ever be morally obligated to become ignorant of information we currently know. The plausibility of this premise, I suggest, derives from the thought that there are no epistemically ‘non-drastic’ ways in which we can cause ourselves to become ignorant of what we already know. Drawing on some recent work in the epistemology and psychology of self-deception and forgetting, I seek to undermine this thought, and thus provide a defense against the challenging argument, by arguing that there are indeed such ways.},
number = {2},
journal = {Episteme},
author = {Matheson, David},
year = {2013},
note = {Edition: 2013/05/24
Publisher: Cambridge University Press},
pages = {193--205},
}
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