Personal identity, multiple personality disorder, and moral personhood. Matthews, S. Philosophical Psychology, 11(1):67–88, 1998. ![Personal identity, multiple personality disorder, and moral personhood [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex M. Schechtman (1990) argues that psychological continuity accounts of personal identity, as represented by D. Parfit's (1971, 1984) account, fail to escape the circularity objection. She claims that Parfit's deployment of quasi-memory (and other quasi-psychological) states to escape circularity implicitly commit us to an implausible view of human psychology. Schechtman suggests that what is lacking here is a coherence condition, and that this is something essential in any account of personal identity. In response to this, the present author argues firstly that circularity may be escaped using quasi-psychological states even with the addition of the coherence condition. Secondly, it is argued that there is something right about the coherence condition, and a major task of this paper is to identify its proper theoretical role. The author does this by reflection on integration therapies for people with multiple personality disorder. The familiar distinction between the moral and the metaphysical concept of the person is developed alongside such reflection. Connecting these 2 issues is the argument that coherence acts as a normative constraint on accounts of personal identity, but that the normative dimension of personhood is not essential to our notion of a person tout court. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
@article{Matthews1998,
abstract = {M. Schechtman (1990) argues that psychological continuity accounts of personal identity, as represented by D. Parfit's (1971, 1984) account, fail to escape the circularity objection. She claims that Parfit's deployment of quasi-memory (and other quasi-psychological) states to escape circularity implicitly commit us to an implausible view of human psychology. Schechtman suggests that what is lacking here is a coherence condition, and that this is something essential in any account of personal identity. In response to this, the present author argues firstly that circularity may be escaped using quasi-psychological states even with the addition of the coherence condition. Secondly, it is argued that there is something right about the coherence condition, and a major task of this paper is to identify its proper theoretical role. The author does this by reflection on integration therapies for people with multiple personality disorder. The familiar distinction between the moral and the metaphysical concept of the person is developed alongside such reflection. Connecting these 2 issues is the argument that coherence acts as a normative constraint on accounts of personal identity, but that the normative dimension of personhood is not essential to our notion of a person tout court. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)},
author = {Matthews, Steve},
doi = {10.1080/09515089808573249},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Matthews - 1998 - Personal identity, multiple personality disorder, and moral personhood.pdf:pdf},
isbn = {0951-5089$\backslash$r1465-394X},
issn = {0951-5089},
journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
number = {1},
pages = {67--88},
title = {{Personal identity, multiple personality disorder, and moral personhood}},
url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09515089808573249},
volume = {11},
year = {1998}
}
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