Building secure file systems out of Byzantine storage. Mazières, D. & Shasha, D. 07/2002 2002. ![Building secure file systems out of Byzantine storage [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex This paper shows how to implement a trusted network file system on an untrusted server. While cryptographic storage techniques exist that allow users to keep data secret from untrusted servers, this work concentrates on the detection of tampering attacks and stale data. Ideally, users of an untrusted storage server would immediately and unconditionally notice any misbehavior on the part of the server. This ideal is unfortunately not achievable. However, we define a notion of data integrity called fork consistency in which, if the server delays just one user from seeing even a single change by another, the two users will never again see one another\textquoterights changes–-a failure easily detectable with on-line communication. We give a practical protocol for a multi-user network file system called SUNDR, and prove that SUNDR offers fork consistency whether or not the server obeys the protocol.
@conference {Mazieres:2002:BSF:571825.571840,
title = {Building secure file systems out of Byzantine storage},
booktitle = {PODC{\textquoteright}02 - Proceedings of the 21st Annual Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing},
series = {PODC {\textquoteright}02},
year = {2002},
month = {07/2002},
pages = {108{\textendash}117},
publisher = {ACM},
organization = {ACM},
address = {Monterey, CA, USA},
abstract = {This paper shows how to implement a trusted network file system on an untrusted server. While cryptographic storage techniques exist that allow users to keep data secret from untrusted servers, this work concentrates on the detection of tampering attacks and stale data. Ideally, users of an untrusted storage server would immediately and unconditionally notice any misbehavior on the part of the server. This ideal is unfortunately not achievable. However, we define a notion of data integrity called fork consistency in which, if the server delays just one user from seeing even a single change by another, the two users will never again see one another{\textquoteright}s changes---a failure easily detectable with on-line communication. We give a practical protocol for a multi-user network file system called SUNDR, and prove that SUNDR offers fork consistency whether or not the server obeys the protocol.},
keywords = {Byzantine storage, detection, secure file system, stale data, tampering attack, trusted network, untrusted server},
isbn = {1-58113-485-1},
doi = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/571825.571840},
url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/571825.571840},
author = {David Mazi{\`e}res and Shasha, Dennis}
}
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