Designing and financing optimal enforcement for small-scale fisheries and dive tourism industries. McDonald, G., Mangin, T., Thomas, L. R., & Costello, C. Marine Policy, 67:105--117, May, 2016.
Designing and financing optimal enforcement for small-scale fisheries and dive tourism industries [link]Paper  doi  abstract   bibtex   
Effective enforcement can reduce the impacts of illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing, resulting in numerous economic, ecological, and social benefits. However, resource managers in small-scale fisheries often lack the expertise and financial resources required to design and implement an effective enforcement system. Here, a bio-economic model is developed to investigate optimal levels of fishery enforcement and financing mechanisms available to recover costs of enforcement. The model is parameterized to represent a small-scale Caribbean lobster fishery, and optimal fishery enforcement levels for three different stakeholder archetypes are considered: (1) a fishing industry only; (2) a dive tourism industry only; and (3) fishing and dive tourism industries. For the illustrative small-scale fishery presented, the optimal level of fishery enforcement decreases with increasing levels of biomass, and is higher when a dive tourism industry is present. Results also indicate that costs of fisheries enforcement can be recovered through a suite of financing mechanisms. However, the timescale over which financing becomes sustainable will depend largely on the current status of the fishery resource. This study may serve as a framework that can be used by resource managers to help design and finance economically optimal fisheries enforcement systems.
@article{mcdonald_designing_2016,
	title = {Designing and financing optimal enforcement for small-scale fisheries and dive tourism industries},
	volume = {67},
	issn = {0308-597X},
	url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X16000476},
	doi = {10.1016/j.marpol.2016.02.003},
	abstract = {Effective enforcement can reduce the impacts of illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing, resulting in numerous economic, ecological, and social benefits. However, resource managers in small-scale fisheries often lack the expertise and financial resources required to design and implement an effective enforcement system. Here, a bio-economic model is developed to investigate optimal levels of fishery enforcement and financing mechanisms available to recover costs of enforcement. The model is parameterized to represent a small-scale Caribbean lobster fishery, and optimal fishery enforcement levels for three different stakeholder archetypes are considered: (1) a fishing industry only; (2) a dive tourism industry only; and (3) fishing and dive tourism industries. For the illustrative small-scale fishery presented, the optimal level of fishery enforcement decreases with increasing levels of biomass, and is higher when a dive tourism industry is present. Results also indicate that costs of fisheries enforcement can be recovered through a suite of financing mechanisms. However, the timescale over which financing becomes sustainable will depend largely on the current status of the fishery resource. This study may serve as a framework that can be used by resource managers to help design and finance economically optimal fisheries enforcement systems.},
	urldate = {2016-03-19},
	journal = {Marine Policy},
	author = {McDonald, Gavin and Mangin, Tracey and Thomas, Lennon R. and Costello, Christopher},
	month = may,
	year = {2016},
	keywords = {Ecosystem services, Fisheries cost-recovery, Illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing, Optimal fisheries enforcement, Small-scale fisheries},
	pages = {105--117},
	file = {1-s2.0-S0308597X16000476-main.pdf:files/54167/1-s2.0-S0308597X16000476-main.pdf:application/pdf;ScienceDirect Full Text PDF:files/54151/McDonald et al. - 2016 - Designing and financing optimal enforcement for sm.pdf:application/pdf;ScienceDirect Snapshot:files/54152/S0308597X16000476.html:text/html}
}
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