@article{Mclnerney2000,
abstract = {[first paragraph] The naturalist conception of persons is that they are evolved social animals who develop in a culture, have distinctive men? tal abilities, and have complex conceptions of themselves. People's conceptions of themselves and other people have impor? tant effects on their behavior, thought processes, and development through time. Personal identity over time is a specially compelling philosophical issue, because normal people conceive and care greatly about how they themselves and other people are defined by and related to their pasts and futures. Philosophical theories can challenge, confirm, or offer revisions for people's deeply held ideas about the connection of people-now to their pasts and futures. The most influential contemporary theories of personal identity through time have failed to appreciate the effects of people's conceptions of the unity of a per? son through time on the unity of a person through time.1 Most theories assume that personal identity (or survival2) consists of or is supervenient upon psychological facts that do not include conceptions of persons' existence through time or assume that per? sonal identity consists of or is supervenient upon such psychological facts plus bodily facts (including neurological facts). By},
author = {Mclnerney, Peter K},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Mclnerney - 2000 - Conceptions of persons and persons through time.pdf:pdf},
journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
number = {2},
pages = {121--133},
title = {{Conceptions of persons and persons through time}},
url = {https://about.jstor.org/terms},
volume = {37},
year = {2000}
}

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