On justifying the norms underlying decision support. Meinard, Y. & Cailloux, O. European Journal of Operational Research, 285(3):1002–1010, September, 2020. ![On justifying the norms underlying decision support [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Hal doi abstract bibtex When decision sciences are applied to concrete problems, Decision Makers (DMs), concerned stakeholders, and the general public typically expect clear recommendations. As emphasized in particular in the literature on ethical dimensions of Operational Research practice, such recommendations are unavoidably conditioned by norms or normative conceptions. Although an extensive literature is devoted to promoting certain norms designed to be largely accepted by decision analysts, studies specifically devoted to determine, at a general level, how decision analysts can decide which norms should underlie their work, are found lacking. To make up for this lacuna, we flesh out the concept of justification. We develop requirements that any justification should satisfy to qualify for being able to justify norms on which recommendations can rest. We then introduce and recommend a series of practical rules that decision analysts should abide by, on the basis of which, in a given decision situation, a decision analyst can decide, together with the DM, whether a given norm underlying a given recommendation can be adopted.
@article{meinard_justification_2020,
title = {On justifying the norms underlying decision support},
keywords = {Deliberated judgment},
abstract = {When decision sciences are applied to concrete problems, Decision Makers (DMs), concerned stakeholders, and the general public typically expect clear recommendations.
As emphasized in particular in the literature on ethical dimensions of Operational Research practice, such recommendations are unavoidably conditioned by norms or normative conceptions.
Although an extensive literature is devoted to promoting certain norms designed to be largely accepted by decision analysts, studies specifically devoted to determine, at a general level, how decision analysts can decide which norms should underlie their work, are found lacking.
To make up for this lacuna, we flesh out the concept of justification.
We develop requirements that any justification should satisfy to qualify for being able to justify norms on which recommendations can rest.
We then introduce and recommend a series of practical rules that decision analysts should abide by, on the basis of which, in a given decision situation, a decision analyst can decide, together with the DM, whether a given norm underlying a given recommendation can be adopted.
},
doi = {10.1016/j.ejor.2020.02.022},
url_HAL = {https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03049579},
author = {Meinard, Yves and Cailloux, Olivier},
month = September,
year = {2020},
journal = {European Journal of Operational Research},
pages = "1002--1010",
volume = 285,
number = 3,
}
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