@article{mendelow_russellian_2023,
	title = {Russellian {Monism} and {Ignorance} of {Non}-structural {Properties}},
	issn = {00048402},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85168095063&doi=10.1080%2f00048402.2023.2243622&partnerID=40&md5=de0509ff1a7be0917ef264bbd38e557c},
	doi = {10.1080/00048402.2023.2243622},
	abstract = {Russellian monists argue that non-structural properties, or a combination of structural and non-structural properties, necessitate phenomenal properties. Different Russellian monists offer varying accounts of the structural/non-structural distinction, leading to divergent forms of Russellian monism. In this paper, I criticise Derk Pereboom’s characterisation of the structural/non-structural distinction proposed in his Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism and further work. I argue that from Pereboom’s characterisation of structural and non-structural properties, one can formulate general metaphysical principles concerning what structural and non-structural properties necessitate. These principles undermine the claim that non-structural properties—either alone or in combination with structural properties—necessitate phenomenal properties. Moreover, these principles are not affected by our supposed inability to conceive of non-structural properties in a manner conducive to the success of conceivability arguments. © 2023 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor \& Francis Group.},
	language = {English},
	journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
	author = {Mendelow, Justin},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Routledge
Type: Article},
}

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