In Defence of the Normative Account of Ignorance. Meylan, A. Erkenntnis, 89(1):207–221, June, 2022. doi abstract bibtex The standard view of ignorance is that it consists in the mere lack of knowledge or true belief. Duncan Pritchard has recently argued, against the standard view, that ignorance is the lack of knowledge/true belief that is due to an improper inquiry. I shall call, Pritchard’s alternative account the Normative Account. The purpose of this article is to strengthen the Normative Account by providing an independent vargument supporting it.
@article{meylan_defence_2022,
title = {In {Defence} of the {Normative} {Account} of {Ignorance}},
volume = {89},
doi = {10.1007/s10670-022-00529-7},
abstract = {The standard view of ignorance is that it consists in the mere lack of knowledge or true belief. Duncan Pritchard has recently argued, against the standard view, that ignorance is the lack of knowledge/true belief that is due to an improper inquiry. I shall call, Pritchard’s alternative account the Normative Account. The purpose of this article is to strengthen the Normative Account by providing an independent vargument supporting it.},
number = {1},
journal = {Erkenntnis},
author = {Meylan, Anne},
month = jun,
year = {2022},
keywords = {Ignorance in history and philosophy of science and technology - general information, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
pages = {207--221},
}
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