In Defence of the Normative Account of Ignorance. Meylan, A. Erkenntnis, 89(1):207 – 221, 2024. Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media B.V. Type: Article
In Defence of the Normative Account of Ignorance [link]Paper  doi  abstract   bibtex   
The standard view of ignorance is that it consists in the mere lack of knowledge or true belief. Duncan Pritchard has recently argued, against the standard view, that ignorance is the lack of knowledge/true belief that is due to an improper inquiry. I shall call, Pritchard’s alternative account the Normative Account. The purpose of this article is to strengthen the Normative Account by providing an independent vargument supporting it. © 2022, The Author(s).
@article{meylan_defence_2024,
	title = {In {Defence} of the {Normative} {Account} of {Ignorance}},
	volume = {89},
	issn = {01650106},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85132841713&doi=10.1007%2fs10670-022-00529-7&partnerID=40&md5=25c855b58c4f420529ed6770fefae4b2},
	doi = {10.1007/s10670-022-00529-7},
	abstract = {The standard view of ignorance is that it consists in the mere lack of knowledge or true belief. Duncan Pritchard has recently argued, against the standard view, that ignorance is the lack of knowledge/true belief that is due to an improper inquiry. I shall call, Pritchard’s alternative account the Normative Account. The purpose of this article is to strengthen the Normative Account by providing an independent vargument supporting it. © 2022, The Author(s).},
	language = {English},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Erkenntnis},
	author = {Meylan, Anne},
	year = {2024},
	note = {Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media B.V.
Type: Article},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier), Source contributeurs},
	pages = {207 -- 221},
}

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