Normative Relations Between Ignorance and Suspension of Judgment: A Systematic Investigation *. Meylan, A. & Raleigh, T. In Suspension in Epistemology and Beyond. Routledge, 2025. Num Pages: 24abstract bibtex In the recent epistemological literature much has been written about the nature of suspending judgment or agnosticism There has also been a surge of recent interest in the nature of ignorance. But what is the relationship between these two epistemically significant states? Prima facie, both suspension and ignorance seem to involve the lack of a correct answer to a question. And, again prima facie, there may be some intuitive attraction to the idea that when one is ignorant whether p, one ought to suspend judgment whether p. In this chapter, we will explore a range of different possible normative connections between ignorance and suspension of judgment. We will also discuss how both ignorance and suspension are related to having inconclusive evidence. As we will see, the issues can be quite complex due to the fact that there are different, competing views about the nature of ignorance and also about the nature of suspension. Moreover, there are importantly different kinds of epistemic norms. Our overall aim then will be to systematically chart how these different choices will impact the possible normative connections between ignorance and suspension.
@incollection{meylan_normative_2025,
title = {Normative {Relations} {Between} {Ignorance} and {Suspension} of {Judgment}: {A} {Systematic} {Investigation} *},
isbn = {978-1-00-347430-2},
shorttitle = {Normative {Relations} {Between} {Ignorance} and {Suspension} of {Judgment}},
abstract = {In the recent epistemological literature much has been written about the nature of suspending judgment or agnosticism There has also been a surge of recent interest in the nature of ignorance. But what is the relationship between these two epistemically significant states? Prima facie, both suspension and ignorance seem to involve the lack of a correct answer to a question. And, again prima facie, there may be some intuitive attraction to the idea that when one is ignorant whether p, one ought to suspend judgment whether p. In this chapter, we will explore a range of different possible normative connections between ignorance and suspension of judgment. We will also discuss how both ignorance and suspension are related to having inconclusive evidence. As we will see, the issues can be quite complex due to the fact that there are different, competing views about the nature of ignorance and also about the nature of suspension. Moreover, there are importantly different kinds of epistemic norms. Our overall aim then will be to systematically chart how these different choices will impact the possible normative connections between ignorance and suspension.},
booktitle = {Suspension in {Epistemology} and {Beyond}},
publisher = {Routledge},
author = {Meylan, Anne and Raleigh, Thomas},
year = {2025},
note = {Num Pages: 24},
keywords = {concept, ignorance, important, suspension, à lire},
}
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