On Being Ignorant. Meylan, A. & Reuter, K. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, June, 2025.
On Being Ignorant [link]Paper  doi  abstract   bibtex   
A traditional view holds that ignorance is simply the absence of knowledge. This view has recently been challenged by the Normative Account, which sees ignorance as involving a normative failure. In this paper, we argue that both perspectives capture important insights. Drawing on three empirical studies, we propose a two-senses account of ignorance, according to which there exist two notions of ignorance: one normative, the other non-normative. We also offer a new explanation of the normative aspect. Our findings suggest that what is negative in being ignorant lies in the expectation that one ought to know the relevant fact.
@article{meylan_being_2025,
	title = {On {Being} {Ignorant}},
	issn = {0045-5091, 1911-0820},
	url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/canadian-journal-of-philosophy/article/on-being-ignorant/E1F121D7A493B3BDE462CA6BB2E2E87F},
	doi = {10.1017/can.2025.10},
	abstract = {A traditional view holds that ignorance is simply the absence of knowledge. This view has recently been challenged by the Normative Account, which sees ignorance as involving a normative failure. In this paper, we argue that both perspectives capture important insights. Drawing on three empirical studies, we propose a two-senses account of ignorance, according to which there exist two notions of ignorance: one normative, the other non-normative. We also offer a new explanation of the normative aspect. Our findings suggest that what is negative in being ignorant lies in the expectation that one ought to know the relevant fact.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2025-07-28},
	journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
	author = {Meylan, Anne and Reuter, Kevin},
	month = jun,
	year = {2025},
	keywords = {concept, ignorance},
	pages = {1--18},
}

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