The unstable core of global finance: Contingent valuation and governance of international accounting standards. Mügge, D. and Stellinga, B. Regulation & Governance, 9(1):47--62, March, 2015.
The unstable core of global finance: Contingent valuation and governance of international accounting standards [link]Paper  doi  abstract   bibtex   
Accounting standards are the foundations of the financial regulatory edifice, and global financial governance is no more stable than the asset valuations that feed it. Yet for two decades and up to this day, no international accounting rule for financial instruments – the bulk of banks' balance sheets – has emerged that was more than a temporary fix, to be succeeded by further reforms. We show how banking regulators have been central to this dynamic and how their support for applying fair value accounting to financial instruments, the cornerstone of regulatory debate, has oscillated throughout the whole period. The two common international political economy approaches to global financial governance, which analyze it either as interest-based bargaining or as ideas-driven expert governance, fail to account for this pattern. In contrast, we show how the contingency of financial valuations itself has made it impossible for regulators to embrace or reject a stable set of accounting rules.
@article{mugge_unstable_2015,
	title = {The unstable core of global finance: {Contingent} valuation and governance of international accounting standards},
	volume = {9},
	copyright = {© 2014 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd},
	issn = {1748-5991},
	shorttitle = {The unstable core of global finance},
	url = {http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12052/abstract},
	doi = {10.1111/rego.12052},
	abstract = {Accounting standards are the foundations of the financial regulatory edifice, and global financial governance is no more stable than the asset valuations that feed it. Yet for two decades and up to this day, no international accounting rule for financial instruments – the bulk of banks' balance sheets – has emerged that was more than a temporary fix, to be succeeded by further reforms. We show how banking regulators have been central to this dynamic and how their support for applying fair value accounting to financial instruments, the cornerstone of regulatory debate, has oscillated throughout the whole period. The two common international political economy approaches to global financial governance, which analyze it either as interest-based bargaining or as ideas-driven expert governance, fail to account for this pattern. In contrast, we show how the contingency of financial valuations itself has made it impossible for regulators to embrace or reject a stable set of accounting rules.},
	language = {en},
	number = {1},
	urldate = {2015-03-31},
	journal = {Regulation \& Governance},
	author = {Mügge, Daniel and Stellinga, Bart},
	month = mar,
	year = {2015},
	keywords = {accounting standards, financial governance, international financial reporting standards, Regulation},
	pages = {47--62},
	file = {Snapshot:files/47457/abstract.html:text/html}
}
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