Continuities and discontinuities between imagination and memory: The view from philosophy. Michaelian, K., Perrin, D., & Sant'Anna, A. In The Cambridge Handbook of Imagination. Cambridge. abstract bibtex Though imagination and memory have much in common, philosophers of memory have so far had little to say about imagination. This has recently begun to change, as research on episodic memory as a form of imaginative mental time travel analogous to episodic future thought has threatened to undermine the view-standard in the philosophy of memory-that memory is sharply distinct from imagination. Covering a cluster of interrelated issues (including the objects of mental time travel, the reference of episodic thought, the epistemic openness of the future, the directness of our knowledge of the past, and immunity to error through misidentification in episodic memory and episodic future thought), this chapter surveys the debate between discontinuists, who argue that episodic remembering and episodic future thinking are processes of fundamentally different kinds, and continuists, who argue that the fact that they have distinct temporal orientations constitutes the only important difference between them-and hence that episodic memory is ultimately just a kind of episodic imagination.
@incollection{Michaeliana,
abstract = {Though imagination and memory have much in common, philosophers of memory have so far had little to say about imagination. This has recently begun to change, as research on episodic memory as a form of imaginative mental time travel analogous to episodic future thought has threatened to undermine the view-standard in the philosophy of memory-that memory is sharply distinct from imagination. Covering a cluster of interrelated issues (including the objects of mental time travel, the reference of episodic thought, the epistemic openness of the future, the directness of our knowledge of the past, and immunity to error through misidentification in episodic memory and episodic future thought), this chapter surveys the debate between discontinuists, who argue that episodic remembering and episodic future thinking are processes of fundamentally different kinds, and continuists, who argue that the fact that they have distinct temporal orientations constitutes the only important difference between them-and hence that episodic memory is ultimately just a kind of episodic imagination.},
address = {Cambridge},
author = {Michaelian, Kourken and Perrin, Denis and Sant'Anna, Andr{\'{e}}},
booktitle = {The Cambridge Handbook of Imagination},
editor = {Abraham, Anna},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Michaelian, Perrin, Sant'Anna - Unknown - Continuities and discontinuities between imagination and memory The view from philosophy.pdf:pdf},
title = {{Continuities and discontinuities between imagination and memory: The view from philosophy}}
}
Downloads: 0
{"_id":"ycACyiKSZcPJRhGJM","bibbaseid":"michaelian-perrin-santanna-continuitiesanddiscontinuitiesbetweenimaginationandmemorytheviewfromphilosophy","downloads":0,"creationDate":"2019-01-05T09:36:45.748Z","title":"Continuities and discontinuities between imagination and memory: The view from philosophy","author_short":["Michaelian, K.","Perrin, D.","Sant'Anna, A."],"year":null,"bibtype":"incollection","biburl":"http://phil-mem.org/phil-mem.bib/","bibdata":{"bibtype":"incollection","type":"incollection","abstract":"Though imagination and memory have much in common, philosophers of memory have so far had little to say about imagination. This has recently begun to change, as research on episodic memory as a form of imaginative mental time travel analogous to episodic future thought has threatened to undermine the view-standard in the philosophy of memory-that memory is sharply distinct from imagination. Covering a cluster of interrelated issues (including the objects of mental time travel, the reference of episodic thought, the epistemic openness of the future, the directness of our knowledge of the past, and immunity to error through misidentification in episodic memory and episodic future thought), this chapter surveys the debate between discontinuists, who argue that episodic remembering and episodic future thinking are processes of fundamentally different kinds, and continuists, who argue that the fact that they have distinct temporal orientations constitutes the only important difference between them-and hence that episodic memory is ultimately just a kind of episodic imagination.","address":"Cambridge","author":[{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Michaelian"],"firstnames":["Kourken"],"suffixes":[]},{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Perrin"],"firstnames":["Denis"],"suffixes":[]},{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Sant'Anna"],"firstnames":["André"],"suffixes":[]}],"booktitle":"The Cambridge Handbook of Imagination","editor":[{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Abraham"],"firstnames":["Anna"],"suffixes":[]}],"file":":Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Michaelian, Perrin, Sant'Anna - Unknown - Continuities and discontinuities between imagination and memory The view from philosophy.pdf:pdf","title":"Continuities and discontinuities between imagination and memory: The view from philosophy","bibtex":"@incollection{Michaeliana,\nabstract = {Though imagination and memory have much in common, philosophers of memory have so far had little to say about imagination. This has recently begun to change, as research on episodic memory as a form of imaginative mental time travel analogous to episodic future thought has threatened to undermine the view-standard in the philosophy of memory-that memory is sharply distinct from imagination. Covering a cluster of interrelated issues (including the objects of mental time travel, the reference of episodic thought, the epistemic openness of the future, the directness of our knowledge of the past, and immunity to error through misidentification in episodic memory and episodic future thought), this chapter surveys the debate between discontinuists, who argue that episodic remembering and episodic future thinking are processes of fundamentally different kinds, and continuists, who argue that the fact that they have distinct temporal orientations constitutes the only important difference between them-and hence that episodic memory is ultimately just a kind of episodic imagination.},\naddress = {Cambridge},\nauthor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Perrin, Denis and Sant'Anna, Andr{\\'{e}}},\nbooktitle = {The Cambridge Handbook of Imagination},\neditor = {Abraham, Anna},\nfile = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Michaelian, Perrin, Sant'Anna - Unknown - Continuities and discontinuities between imagination and memory The view from philosophy.pdf:pdf},\ntitle = {{Continuities and discontinuities between imagination and memory: The view from philosophy}}\n}\n","author_short":["Michaelian, K.","Perrin, D.","Sant'Anna, A."],"editor_short":["Abraham, A."],"key":"Michaeliana","id":"Michaeliana","bibbaseid":"michaelian-perrin-santanna-continuitiesanddiscontinuitiesbetweenimaginationandmemorytheviewfromphilosophy","role":"author","urls":{},"downloads":0},"search_terms":["continuities","discontinuities","between","imagination","memory","view","philosophy","michaelian","perrin","sant'anna"],"keywords":["continuism","discontinuism number of words-total: 9230 (main te","episodic imagination","episodic memory","mental time travel"],"authorIDs":[],"dataSources":["xpm4HPGis5kQeHY7z"]}