Coordination of institutional investors – From risk dominance to payoff dominance in stag hunt-like games. Mielke, J., Steudle, G., A., & Jaeger, C. paper-progress, 2016.
abstract   bibtex   
This paper aims at a better understanding of the role of expectations in coordination failure trough an alteration of a non-cooperative assurance game. The three-player stag hunt compares player A’s investment strategy to other players’ strategies. The game is then altered by a change of investment costs through a policy parameter.
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 title = {Coordination of institutional investors – From risk dominance to payoff dominance in stag hunt-like games},
 type = {article},
 year = {2016},
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 citation_key = {mielke2016coordination},
 abstract = {This paper aims at a better understanding of the role of expectations in coordination failure trough an alteration of a non-cooperative assurance game. The three-player stag hunt compares player A’s investment strategy to other players’ strategies. The game is then altered by a change of investment costs through a policy parameter.},
 bibtype = {article},
 author = {Mielke, Jahel and Steudle, Gesine A. and Jaeger, Carlo},
 journal = {paper-progress}
}
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