@article{
 title = {Dlaczego Wittgenstein nie był dualistą?},
 type = {article},
 year = {2002},
 keywords = {Wittgenstein,argument z języka prywatnego},
 pages = {69-83},
 volume = {4},
 websites = {http://marcinmilkowski.pl/downloads/wittgenstein.pdf,http://marcinmilkowski.pl/downloads/witt-cp.tif.pdf},
 id = {5712180c-9dbf-3415-9718-2b50e2b5b93e},
 created = {2012-11-23T09:54:49.000Z},
 file_attached = {false},
 profile_id = {eec23e46-784a-3642-9213-a9223ed06a44},
 last_modified = {2014-10-06T15:04:47.000Z},
 read = {true},
 starred = {false},
 authored = {true},
 confirmed = {true},
 hidden = {false},
 citation_key = {Mikowski2002b},
 abstract = {Ordinary language contains numerous expressions that presuppose Cartesian dualism. Wittgenstcin found t[iis presumption ungrounded, mainly because his philosophical anatysis indicated to hirn that the meaning of linguistic expressions is ultimately determined by ostensiye defnitions. Such definitions cannot be used to identify mental states or their elements, so psychological expressions has to be rejected as based on a fiction of priyate language. Contemporary Wittgensteinians, following Austin and Ryle, usually propose an attempts haye the merit of basically agreeing with the yiews of Wittgenstein himself whose operational attitude did not allow him to formulate positiye ontological claims and macie him content with his rejection of dualism. At the same tinie, howeyer, these attempts seem unsatisfactory insofar as they tend to refute cognitiye scierice by using purely conceptual or yerbal distinctions. they cannot support a priyate language. Hence, common sense interpretation of operational conception of meaning for ordinary language. Their przykład nie jest jednoznaczny, to metoda późnego tym choćby},
 bibtype = {article},
 author = {Miłkowski, Marcin},
 journal = {Przegląd Filozoficzny – Nowa Seria}
}

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