@incollection{Milburn,
abstract = {In our paper, we distinguish between two forms of memory knowledge: experiential memory knowledge and stored memory knowledge. We argue that, mutatis mutandis, the case that Pritchard makes for epistemological disjunctivism regarding perceptual knowledge can be made for epistemological disjunctivism regarding experiential memory knowledge. At the same time, we argue against a disjunctivist account of stored memory knowledge.},
address = {London},
author = {Milburn, Joe and Moon, Andrew},
booktitle = {New Essays in Epistemological Disjunctivism},
editor = {Doyle, C. and Milburn, J. and Pritchard, D.},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Milburn, Moon - Unknown - Two forms of memory knowledge and epistemological disjunctivism.pdf:pdf},
publisher = {Routledge},
title = {{Two forms of memory knowledge and epistemological disjunctivism}}
}

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