Policy bundling to overcome loss aversion: A method for improving legislative outcomes. Milkman, K. L., Mazza, M. C., Shu, L. L., Tsay, C., & Bazerman, M. H. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes.
Policy bundling to overcome loss aversion: A method for improving legislative outcomes [link]Paper  doi  abstract   bibtex   
\textlessp\textgreater\textlessbr/\textgreaterPolicies that would create net benefits for society that contain salient costs frequently lack enough support for enactment because losses loom larger than gains. To address this consequence of loss aversion, we propose a policy-bundling technique in which related bills involving both losses and gains are combined to offset separate bills' costs while preserving their net benefits. We argue this method can transform unpopular individual pieces of legislation, which would lack the support for implementation, into more popular policies. Study 1 confirms that bundling increases support for bills with costs and benefits and that bundled legislation is valued more than the sum of its parts. Study 2 shows this finding stems from a diminished focus on losses and heightened focus on gains. Study 3 extends our findings to policies involving costs and benefits of the same type (e.g., lives) generated by different sources (e.g., food vs. fire safety).\textless/p\textgreater
@article{milkman_policy_????,
	title = {Policy bundling to overcome loss aversion: {A} method for improving legislative outcomes},
	volume = {In Press, Corrected Proof},
	issn = {0749-5978},
	shorttitle = {Policy bundling to overcome loss aversion},
	url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0749597811000793},
	doi = {16/j.obhdp.2011.07.001},
	abstract = {{\textless}p{\textgreater}{\textless}br/{\textgreater}Policies that would create net benefits for society that contain salient costs frequently lack enough support for enactment because losses loom larger than gains. To address this consequence of loss aversion, we propose a policy-bundling technique in which related bills involving both losses and gains are combined to offset separate bills' costs while preserving their net benefits. We argue this method can transform unpopular individual pieces of legislation, which would lack the support for implementation, into more popular policies. Study 1 confirms that bundling increases support for bills with costs and benefits and that bundled legislation is valued more than the sum of its parts. Study 2 shows this finding stems from a diminished focus on losses and heightened focus on gains. Study 3 extends our findings to policies involving costs and benefits of the same type (e.g., lives) generated by different sources (e.g., food vs. fire safety).{\textless}/p{\textgreater}},
	urldate = {2011-08-01},
	journal = {Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes},
	author = {Milkman, Katherine L. and Mazza, Mary Carol and Shu, Lisa L. and Tsay, Chia-Jung and Bazerman, Max H.},
	keywords = {Behavioral economics, Joint-separate evaluation, Joint–separate evaluation, Loss aversion, Policy bundling, Prospect theory},
	file = {ScienceDirect Full Text PDF:files/38009/Milkman et al. - 2012 - Policy bundling to overcome loss aversion A metho.pdf:application/pdf;ScienceDirect Snapshot:files/34314/Milkman et al. - Policy bundling to overcome loss aversion A metho:;sdarti9807cle.pdf:files/35962/sdarti9807cle.pdf:application/pdf;sdarticle.pdf:files/34279/sdarticle.pdf:application/pdf}
}

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