@article{miller_how_1999,
	title = {How phenomenological content determines the intentional object},
	volume = {16},
	doi = {10.1023/a:1006266202938},
	abstract = {Suppose I see one of my wife’s brothers – John or Jude – on the other side of a parking lot. At that distance, the image on my retina would be the same no matter which brother I was seeing, because John and Jude are identical twins. If we rule out precognition and other extraordinary forms of knowing, then the content of the experience which is accessible by means of phenomenological reflection – the phenomenological content – would be the same, no matter which brother I was seeing. Examples like this have convinced many philosophers that narrow content (content defined in terms of the bodily states or experiences of a single subject) does not determine the intentional object of an experience. Determination seems to require a causal link, or information which is external to the mental and bodily states of the subject. The thesis that this is so constitutes externalism. The opposite thesis, the thesis that some form of narrow content determines the intentional object, is internalism.},
	journal = {Husserl Studies},
	author = {Miller, George H.},
	year = {1999},
	note = {bibtex*:MillerHowphenomenologicalcontent1999},
	keywords = {conteúdo fenomenológico, internalismo, objeto intencional},
	pages = {1--24},
}

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