Social Group Moral Encroachment. Mitova, V. Episteme, 2024. Publisher: Cambridge University Press Type: Article![Social Group Moral Encroachment [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex According to moral encroachers, the moral stakes of a belief partly determine how much evidence we need for the belief to count as knowledge. This view concerns the beliefs of individual believers. In this paper, I argue for a social group version of moral encroachment: dominant groups, such as white people or men, need to have more evidence than the marginalised in order for some of their beliefs to constitute knowledge. I argue for this claim in three steps. First, I spell out the group moral stakes involved - the harms dominant knowers cause the marginalised and the knowledge economy. Second, I show off the theoretical benefits of having the notion of social group moral encroachment at our disposal: it can be an invaluable tool for decolonial and feminist epistemologists if they want to avoid the relativistic ring to their views (a ring that tends to put off many well-wishers). Finally, I start on a positive account of social group moral encroachment by addressing a potential puzzle and responding to objections. Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press.
@article{mitova_social_2024,
title = {Social {Group} {Moral} {Encroachment}},
issn = {17423600},
url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85186073538&doi=10.1017%2fepi.2024.7&partnerID=40&md5=4504e7913c9a205091e483123ee2d6f5},
doi = {10.1017/epi.2024.7},
abstract = {According to moral encroachers, the moral stakes of a belief partly determine how much evidence we need for the belief to count as knowledge. This view concerns the beliefs of individual believers. In this paper, I argue for a social group version of moral encroachment: dominant groups, such as white people or men, need to have more evidence than the marginalised in order for some of their beliefs to constitute knowledge. I argue for this claim in three steps. First, I spell out the group moral stakes involved - the harms dominant knowers cause the marginalised and the knowledge economy. Second, I show off the theoretical benefits of having the notion of social group moral encroachment at our disposal: it can be an invaluable tool for decolonial and feminist epistemologists if they want to avoid the relativistic ring to their views (a ring that tends to put off many well-wishers). Finally, I start on a positive account of social group moral encroachment by addressing a potential puzzle and responding to objections. Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press.},
language = {English},
journal = {Episteme},
author = {Mitova, Veli},
year = {2024},
note = {Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Type: Article},
keywords = {Moral encroachment, collective responsibility, epistemology of groups, group belief, social groups, white ignorance},
}
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