Socialising epistemic risk: On the risks of epistemic injustice. Mitova, V. Metaphilosophy, 54(4):539 – 552, 2023. Publisher: John Wiley and Sons Inc Type: Article![Socialising epistemic risk: On the risks of epistemic injustice [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex Epistemic risk is of central importance to epistemology nowadays: one common way in which a belief can fail to be knowledge is by being formed in an epistemically risky way, that is, a way that makes it true by luck. Recently, epistemologists have been expanding this rather narrow conception of risk in every direction, except arguably the most obvious one—to enable it to accommodate the increasingly commonplace thought that knowledge has an irreducibly social dimension. This paper fills this lacuna by bringing issues of epistemic injustice to bear on epistemic risk. In particular, it draws on the phenomenon of white ignorance, to sketch a more social notion of epistemic risk, on which the interests of one's epistemic community partly determine whether a belief-forming procedure is epistemically risky. © 2023 The Author. Metaphilosophy published by Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
@article{mitova_socialising_2023,
title = {Socialising epistemic risk: {On} the risks of epistemic injustice},
volume = {54},
issn = {00261068},
url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85162698542&doi=10.1111%2fmeta.12640&partnerID=40&md5=bad62566c41f0adafd26d263adefae97},
doi = {10.1111/meta.12640},
abstract = {Epistemic risk is of central importance to epistemology nowadays: one common way in which a belief can fail to be knowledge is by being formed in an epistemically risky way, that is, a way that makes it true by luck. Recently, epistemologists have been expanding this rather narrow conception of risk in every direction, except arguably the most obvious one—to enable it to accommodate the increasingly commonplace thought that knowledge has an irreducibly social dimension. This paper fills this lacuna by bringing issues of epistemic injustice to bear on epistemic risk. In particular, it draws on the phenomenon of white ignorance, to sketch a more social notion of epistemic risk, on which the interests of one's epistemic community partly determine whether a belief-forming procedure is epistemically risky. © 2023 The Author. Metaphilosophy published by Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley \& Sons Ltd.},
language = {English},
number = {4},
journal = {Metaphilosophy},
author = {Mitova, Veli},
year = {2023},
note = {Publisher: John Wiley and Sons Inc
Type: Article},
pages = {539 -- 552},
}
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